🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Host Header Injection in Auth Callback #781
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This PR addresses a Host Header Injection vulnerability in the authentication callback route.
Previously, the
resolveRedirectPathfunction trustedX-Forwarded-Hostororiginheaders to validate and construct redirect URLs. This could allow an attacker to spoof the host header and redirect authenticated users to a malicious site.The fix involves:
resolveRedirectPathto strictly validate the redirect target against the trustedNEXT_PUBLIC_SITE_URL(retrieved viagetSiteUrl()).GEThandler to usegetSiteUrl()when constructing the absolute redirect URL.NEXT_PUBLIC_SITE_URL.This ensures that redirects always go to the configured application domain.
Additionally,
package-lock.jsonwas removed as the project usespnpm.PR created automatically by Jules for task 17823098564230585764 started by @timothyfroehlich