🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Host Header Injection in Auth Callback #781
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Refactored `resolveRedirectPath` in `src/app/auth/callback/route.ts` to strictly validate redirect URLs against the configured `NEXT_PUBLIC_SITE_URL` via `getSiteUrl()`. This prevents Host Header Injection attacks where a malicious `X-Forwarded-Host` header could redirect users to an attacker-controlled domain. - Modified `resolveRedirectPath` to ignore `origin` and `forwardedHost` inputs and use `getSiteUrl()` instead. - Updated `GET` handler to use `getSiteUrl()` for constructing the base redirect URL. - Updated tests in `src/app/auth/callback/route.test.ts` to reflect the new signature and verify security against spoofed hosts. - Removed `package-lock.json` as the project uses pnpm.
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Pull request overview
This PR addresses a critical Host Header Injection vulnerability in the authentication callback route. Previously, the code trusted X-Forwarded-Host or origin headers, which could allow attackers to redirect authenticated users to malicious sites by spoofing headers.
Changes:
- Refactored
resolveRedirectPathto validate redirects strictly against the configuredNEXT_PUBLIC_SITE_URLinstead of trusting request headers - Updated the
GEThandler to consistently usegetSiteUrl()for all redirect URL construction - Enhanced unit tests to verify the new security behavior with proper environment variable mocking
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 2 out of 2 changed files in this pull request and generated 1 comment.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| src/app/auth/callback/route.ts | Removed header-based host validation, now uses configured site URL exclusively for redirect validation and construction |
| src/app/auth/callback/route.test.ts | Updated tests to mock NEXT_PUBLIC_SITE_URL and validate that only matching hosts are accepted, rejecting forwarded hosts |
| // getSiteUrl() typically does not have trailing slash, but good to be safe. | ||
| // Actually getSiteUrl implementation: return `...` (no trailing slash usually). | ||
| // But redirectPath from resolveRedirectPath always starts with / due to isInternalUrl check. |
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These comments are verbose and somewhat redundant. The first sentence makes the point, but then it goes on to explain implementation details that are already evident from the code itself. Consider simplifying to just the key insight: "Ensure redirectPath starts with / to avoid double slashes if siteUrl has trailing slash".
| // getSiteUrl() typically does not have trailing slash, but good to be safe. | |
| // Actually getSiteUrl implementation: return `...` (no trailing slash usually). | |
| // But redirectPath from resolveRedirectPath always starts with / due to isInternalUrl check. |
timothyfroehlich
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@jules Critical security fix for Host Header Injection vulnerability in auth callback. All CI checks passing.
timothyfroehlich
deleted the
sentinel-auth-callback-fix-17823098564230585764
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This PR addresses a Host Header Injection vulnerability in the authentication callback route.
Previously, the
resolveRedirectPathfunction trustedX-Forwarded-Hostororiginheaders to validate and construct redirect URLs. This could allow an attacker to spoof the host header and redirect authenticated users to a malicious site.The fix involves:
resolveRedirectPathto strictly validate the redirect target against the trustedNEXT_PUBLIC_SITE_URL(retrieved viagetSiteUrl()).GEThandler to usegetSiteUrl()when constructing the absolute redirect URL.NEXT_PUBLIC_SITE_URL.This ensures that redirects always go to the configured application domain.
Additionally,
package-lock.jsonwas removed as the project usespnpm.PR created automatically by Jules for task 17823098564230585764 started by @timothyfroehlich