Summary
On Windows, a URI using backslash traversal (e.g. \..\..\ secret.txt) bypasses the directory traversal check in Template.__init__ and the posixpath-based normalization in TemplateLookup.get_template(), allowing reads of files outside the configured template directory.
Details
The root cause is a mismatch between posixpath (used for URI normalization in get_template()) and os.path (used for file access via os.path.isfile() and validation via os.path.normpath() in Template.__init__). On Windows, os.path is ntpath, which treats \ as a path separator, while posixpath treats it as a literal character.
The vulnerability chain:
get_template() strips only leading / via re.sub(r"^\/+", "", uri) and normalizes with posixpath — backslash \ is treated as a literal character, so \..\ secret.txt passes through with .. undetected.
Template.__init__() validation uses os.path.normpath() — on Windows this resolves \..\ secret.txt to \secret.txt, which does not start with .., so the startswith("..") check passes.
os.path.isfile() on Windows interprets \ as a path separator, resolving the .. traversal and finding files outside the template directory.
Affected code
mako/lookup.py: TemplateLookup.get_template() uses posixpath.normpath/posixpath.join for path construction but os.path.isfile() for existence check
mako/template.py: Template.__init__() URI validation uses os.path.normpath() which on Windows resolves backslash traversal to a form that passes the startswith("..") guard
Impact
If an application passes user-controlled template names or include paths to TemplateLookup.get_template(), an attacker on Windows may be able to load and disclose readable files outside the configured template directory. The primary impact is local file disclosure. If the targeted file contains Mako/Python template syntax, it may also be parsed and executed as a template.
Remediation
The fix should normalize backslashes to forward slashes early in the URI processing pipeline, before any path operations, to ensure consistent behavior across platforms.
References
Summary
On Windows, a URI using backslash traversal (e.g.
\..\..\ secret.txt) bypasses the directory traversal check inTemplate.__init__and theposixpath-based normalization inTemplateLookup.get_template(), allowing reads of files outside the configured template directory.Details
The root cause is a mismatch between
posixpath(used for URI normalization inget_template()) andos.path(used for file access viaos.path.isfile()and validation viaos.path.normpath()inTemplate.__init__). On Windows,os.pathisntpath, which treats\as a path separator, whileposixpathtreats it as a literal character.The vulnerability chain:
get_template()strips only leading/viare.sub(r"^\/+", "", uri)and normalizes withposixpath— backslash\is treated as a literal character, so\..\ secret.txtpasses through with..undetected.Template.__init__()validation usesos.path.normpath()— on Windows this resolves\..\ secret.txtto\secret.txt, which does not start with.., so thestartswith("..")check passes.os.path.isfile()on Windows interprets\as a path separator, resolving the..traversal and finding files outside the template directory.Affected code
mako/lookup.py:TemplateLookup.get_template()usesposixpath.normpath/posixpath.joinfor path construction butos.path.isfile()for existence checkmako/template.py:Template.__init__()URI validation usesos.path.normpath()which on Windows resolves backslash traversal to a form that passes thestartswith("..")guardImpact
If an application passes user-controlled template names or include paths to
TemplateLookup.get_template(), an attacker on Windows may be able to load and disclose readable files outside the configured template directory. The primary impact is local file disclosure. If the targeted file contains Mako/Python template syntax, it may also be parsed and executed as a template.Remediation
The fix should normalize backslashes to forward slashes early in the URI processing pipeline, before any path operations, to ensure consistent behavior across platforms.
References