Security: Untrusted package installation from catalog config enables arbitrary code execution#731
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tuanaiseo wants to merge 1 commit intoalan-turing-institute:mainfrom
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… config `install_package()` builds a pip target directly from `config["url"]`/`config["github_branch"]` and installs it when `allow_install` is enabled. If a catalog/model config is attacker-controlled (or tampered), this can install and execute malicious package code during install/import. Affected files: installer.py Signed-off-by: tuanaiseo <221258316+tuanaiseo@users.noreply.github.com>
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Problem
install_package()builds a pip target directly fromconfig["url"]/config["github_branch"]and installs it whenallow_installis enabled. If a catalog/model config is attacker-controlled (or tampered), this can install and execute malicious package code during install/import.Severity:
criticalFile:
src/scivision/io/installer.pySolution
Treat config as untrusted input: enforce a strict allowlist of approved package sources, require immutable pinned commit SHAs/tags (not branches), verify package integrity/signatures, and keep
allow_install=Falseby default for runtime paths.Changes
src/scivision/io/installer.py(modified)Testing