ci: add Docker image build provenance attestation#982
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anotherGoogleFan wants to merge 1 commit intoankitpokhrel:mainfrom
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ci: add Docker image build provenance attestation#982anotherGoogleFan wants to merge 1 commit intoankitpokhrel:mainfrom
anotherGoogleFan wants to merge 1 commit intoankitpokhrel:mainfrom
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Summary
This PR adds GitHub build provenance attestation to the Docker publish workflow.
It updates the existing GHCR publish job so the workflow can generate and publish a provenance attestation for the pushed container image. This gives downstream users a verifiable link between the published image and the GitHub Actions workflow run and commit that produced it.
The recent widely publicized Linux xz backdoor incident is a classic example of "clean source code, but the released pre-compiled binaries were compromised." This illustrates the crucial importance of the credibility of "released artifacts" within the software supply chain. Problems don't necessarily only arise at the public source code level; they can also occur in the actual built, packaged, and distributed binary artifacts. The Provenance mechanism provides this kind of "source verifiability," helping downstream users confirm that the files they receive come from the expected official build chain.
docker/build-push-actionValidation
.github/workflows/docker.ymllocally (python3+ YAML parser)steps.push.outputs.digestNotes