ci: declare contents:read on draft-release workflow#3938
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Signed-off-by: Arpit Jain <arpitjain099@gmail.com>
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Pins
.github/workflows/draft-release.ymltopermissions: contents: readat the workflow level. The job usessecrets.MATZBOT_AUTO_UPDATE_TOKENfor the commit step and forpeter-evans/create-pull-request, so every operation that writes to the repository or opens a PR goes through that PAT and notGITHUB_TOKEN. The default token here is only used by the implicitactions/checkoutcalls (read on contents, read on the cross-orgruby/rubyclone).Even though the writes are routed through a PAT, an explicit cap matters because of CVE-2025-30066 (the March 2025
tj-actions/changed-filescompromise). A tampered third-party action exfiltratesGITHUB_TOKENfrom workflow logs and the leaked token carries whatever scope was issued at the workflow level. Without an in-file declaration, that scope is whatever the org default is set to today, which can be broader than what this workflow actually needs. Pinning here makes the minimum enforceable, gives drift protection if the default ever widens, and registers with OpenSSF Scorecard's Token-Permissions check.YAML validated locally with
yaml.safe_load.