Improve type safety and bounds checking in EVP cipher ctrl handlers#3034
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Improve type safety and bounds checking in EVP cipher ctrl handlers#3034
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Codecov Report❌ Patch coverage is
Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## main #3034 +/- ##
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Coverage 78.35% 78.35%
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Files 689 689
Lines 121010 121012 +2
Branches 16992 16993 +1
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+ Hits 94813 94823 +10
+ Misses 25302 25293 -9
- Partials 895 896 +1 ☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry. 🚀 New features to boost your workflow:
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torben-hansen
approved these changes
Feb 25, 2026
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Description of changes:
Fixes minor correctness and safety issues in the AES-GCM and AES-CCM EVP cipher ctrl handlers:
e_aes.c(EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV): Added bounds validation forarg(arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen). The companion handlerEVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GENalready validatesargbefore the samegctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - argpointer arithmetic, butSET_IV_INVdid not, allowing potential out-of-bounds access from a misuse of the API.e_aesccm.cEVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: The handler wrote through auint32_t *cast, but the caller inEVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_lengthpasses anint *. This is a strict aliasing violation. Changed to*(int *)ptrto match the caller and the GCM handler's convention.CCM_L_TO_NONCE_LENmacro: Added parentheses around the macro parameter to follow standard C macro hygiene.Call-outs:
The
uint32_t *vsint *mismatch is undefined behavior under C strict aliasing rules, though it is unlikely to cause issues in practice since both types are 32 bits on almost all platforms. The other two changes are defensive hardening.Testing:
Existing tests cover these code paths. No behavioral change is expected for valid inputs.
By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license and the ISC license.