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Pull request for series with
subject: bpf, arm64: Do not audit capability check in do_jit()
version: 1
url: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=1030464

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Upstream branch: 835a507
series: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=1030464
version: 1

Analogically to the x86 commit 881a9c9 ("bpf: Do not audit
capability check in do_jit()"), change the capable() call to
ns_capable_noaudit() in order to avoid spurious SELinux denials in audit
log.

The commit log from that commit applies here as well:
"""
The failure of this check only results in a security mitigation being
applied, slightly affecting performance of the compiled BPF program. It
doesn't result in a failed syscall, an thus auditing a failed LSM
permission check for it is unwanted. For example with SELinux, it causes
a denial to be reported for confined processes running as root, which
tends to be flagged as a problem to be fixed in the policy. Yet
dontauditing or allowing CAP_SYS_ADMIN to the domain may not be
desirable, as it would allow/silence also other checks - either going
against the principle of least privilege or making debugging potentially
harder.

Fix it by changing it from capable() to ns_capable_noaudit(), which
instructs the LSMs to not audit the resulting denials.
"""

Fixes: f300769 ("arm64: bpf: Only mitigate cBPF programs loaded by unprivileged users")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>
@kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc
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Upstream branch: 835a507
series: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=1030464
version: 1

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